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ABSTRACT 
 
Clarifying Resource Dependence: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Dependence and 
Autonomy in Entrepreneurial Firms 
Curtis R. Sproul 
 
 Entrepreneurial firms face dependence on other firms in the external environment to 
access resources critical for the development and survival of the firm. While substantial research 
has examined resource dependence and how firms may remedy such dependencies, the literature 
often fails to acknowledge key factors that can predict and explain firm behavior and outcomes 
in such situations. Firms are shown to enter into inter-organizational relationships in order to 
remedy resource dependencies, but studies typically evaluate such relationships according to 
their structure, rather than the resource being sought. Research also frequently ignores the role of 
autonomy in resource dependence. As gaining autonomy is the primary goal of resource 
dependence remedies, studies thus often assume autonomy is gained or may fail to consider the 
social complexity of the environment. Resource dependence remedies are also shown to vary in 
terms of their relationship to performance, creating additional questions within the literature. 
This dissertation seeks to shed light on these issues by considering the type of resource sought 
during a dependence remedy, the role of autonomy in dependence remedies, and how remedies 
relate to firm performance. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
Resource dependence theory (RDT) (Pfeffer, 1972a; Pfeffer, 1972b; Pfeffer, 1972c; 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) explains how organizations are influenced by their external 
environment and what actions may be taken to manage the environment. The theory suggests 
that organizations are embedded in social relationships and interdependent networks with other 
organizations that may have differing goals. These social relationships and networks are 
influenced by power, causing some organizations to be dependent on other organizations for 
critical resources. Dependence on other organizations creates circumstances in which the 
survival and success of the focal organization are uncertain (Pfeffer, 1987).  
Considerable attention is devoted to the question of how firms alleviate their 
dependencies on other firms, referred to in this dissertation as dependence remedies. Researchers 
discuss many remedies, often focusing on inter-organizational relationships (IORs) such as joint 
ventures (e.g., Pfeffer & Nowak, 1976), alliances (e.g., Xia, 2011), mergers and acquisitions 
(e.g., Finkelstein, 1997), as well as the board of directors (Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000). 
Researchers also examine how remedies lead to outcomes such as firm performance (e.g., Lavie, 
2007), the likelihood of a merger (e.g., Wang & Zajac, 2007), and alliance outcomes (e.g., 
Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005). These antecedents and outcomes may vary in detail, but each 
represents a specific action by a firm in conjunction with another firm and that action’s outcome, 
taken in an attempt to remedy dependence. This dissertation examines such antecedents and 
outcomes by focusing specifically on inter-organizational relationships (IORs) such as joint 
ventures, alliances, mergers and acquisitions, as well as the board of directors’ composition. 
Firms frequently utilize these remedies, providing an opportunity to more carefully examine the 
relationship between resource dependence remedies and their outcomes.  
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Firms taking action to remedy dependence are seeking autonomy. Autonomy is a firm’s 
freedom to make decisions regarding its internal resources without external influence (Oliver, 
1991a). Pfeffer (2003) explains that autonomy is a critical concept for achieving desired 
outcomes in RDT. Further, autonomy considers actors and concepts beyond customers and 
products that were the primary focus of organizational research before RDT (Pfeffer, 2003). 
Suppliers, government firms, and other actors in the environment that can affect the resources of 
a firm may be considered when examining a firm’s autonomy (Pfeffer, 2003). As such, 
autonomy is a critical component of RDT research.      
RDT provides a strong theoretical lens for examining firms because it recognizes that 
firms exist within a larger social environment comprised of other firms that may have differing 
goals, and that those firms may exercise power and control over a focal firm by constraining its 
resources (Wry, Cobb, & Aldrich, 2013). Additionally, firms are unable to meet all of the various 
demands arising from the environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). RDT’s recognition of power 
as an important aspect of IORs helps explain what demands a firm chooses to meet and may 
explain what otherwise appears to be irrational behavior (Pfeffer, 1987). At the same time, RDT 
may consider more rationally sought outcomes such as firm performance (e.g., Kor & Leblebici, 
2005). By looking beyond efficiency-based reasons for IORs, RDT provides a more holistic 
approach to understanding strategic firm choices and their consequences (Pfeffer, 2003).    
Problematic Issues in Resource Dependence Research 
While resource dependence research has made considerable empirical and theoretical 
advancements (Cascario & Piskorski, 2005), unexplored and unanswered questions remain. This 
dissertation explores four specific problems that prevent researchers from completely explaining 
and predicting firm actions and outcomes: (1) inadequate explanation of how different specific 
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resource needs are remedied, (2) a lack of theoretical and empirical work regarding autonomy, 
(3) failure to consider how different remedies for dependence relate to different types of 
performance, and (4) failure to consider how firms may prevent new dependencies from 
developing when firms take action to reduce dependence. Discussion of these problems 
continues in greater detail in the following paragraphs. 
First, RDT often explores remedies for dependence according to the structure of the 
remedy, rather than the resource being sought. To better understand these remedies, more focus 
should be given to the initial dependencies that firms face. While some research has examined 
different types of dependence (e.g., Gabrielsson, 2007), a thorough understanding of the 
differences between resource dependence remedies and their outcomes does not exist (Drees & 
Heugens, 2013; Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009). By having a clearer understanding of the 
specific dependencies that firms face, research in RDT can better explain how firms can remedy 
such dependencies and capture additional benefits. For example, the success of joint ventures 
(e.g., Das & Teng, 2003), acquisitions (e.g., Moatti, Ren, Anand, & Dussauge, 2015), or the 
appointment of a specific type of director to the board (e.g., Lester, Hillman, Zardkoohi, & 
Cannella, 2008) typically dominate the literature. While these avenues of study are important to 
the understanding of firms, they often ignore the type of resource sought by the firm.  For 
example, firms seeking manufacturing resources are likely to enter into IORs with corporations, 
while firms seeking marketing resources are not (Katila, Rosenberger, & Eisenhardt, 2008).  
Research ignoring the type of dependence may thus be overlooking an important explanatory 
characteristic.  
Second, studies using a resource dependence lens often overlook autonomy as a distinct 
construct of material importance. Originally conceived as an industry-level construct (Burt 1979; 
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1980), autonomy has also been used at the firm-level to measure the ability to deal with payment 
problems and independence from government (Peng & Luo, 2000), subunit power (Galang & 
Ferris, 1997), cash on hand (Uzzi, 1999), and management (as opposed to ownership) controlled 
firms (Stearns & Mizruchi, 1986). Broadly speaking, autonomy has been shown to mediate the 
relationship between IORs and performance (Drees & Heugens, 2013). However, scholars lack a 
sufficient conceptual understanding of autonomy. The limited development of the autonomy 
construct has led to a multitude of operationalizations, which further complicates the 
understanding of resource dependence and the outcomes firms seek through dependence 
remedies. Furthermore, research suggests that autonomy is multifaceted. For example, Drees and 
Heugens (2013) find that autonomy differs when IORs are ownership-based and non-ownership-
based. Given that autonomy mediates the relationship between actions that remedy dependence 
and performance, a clearer understanding of the construct, as well as what types of autonomy 
may exist may provide evidence that further explains the remedies that firm pursue in their 
attempts to reduce dependence, and how those attempts relate to firm performance.  
Third, RDT is not a consistent predictor of firm performance (Drees & Huegens, 2013).  
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argue and Pfeffer (2003) conspicuously states that remedies for 
dependence are sometimes successful. Additionally, RDT does not assume that firm actions are 
taken with conscious, economically beneficial factors in mind, nor does it exclude such actions 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Pfeffer, 1987). Burt (1983) addresses one aspect of mixed 
performance results and uncertain drivers of dependence remedies, suggesting that cooptive 
IORs are maintained as long as they are beneficial to both firms, therefore producing little 
variance in outcomes. Burt’s (1983) reasoning, though, focuses only on the exercise of power. 
Indeed, RDT produces both positive (e.g., Lavie, 2007) and negative (e.g., Koka & Prescott, 
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2008; Hayward, 2003) relationships with firm performance.   Additionally, no specific link 
between remedy and performance type has been investigated. Understanding differences in 
performance outcomes and what performance types are likely to arise from specific remedies can 
significantly advance the resource dependence literature. 
Finally, Pfeffer (1987) suggests that remedies for resource dependence are likely to 
produce new sets of dependencies, leaving firms in new but still dependent situations. For 
example, firms may appoint a new board member from a financial institution in an attempt to 
remedy a need for capital, only to become dependent on the financial institution for survival and 
thus influenced by the new board member (Mizruchi, 1996). In contrast, IORs involving a degree 
of cooperation or that provide complementary resources in addition to the exchanged resources 
may create a set of conditions that lead to mutual benefit for both firms (Oliver, 1990).  Oliver 
(1990) suggested that IORs could exist due to reciprocity, efficiency, or stability. IORs that do 
exist for these reasons, rather than coercion, may bring benefits to the firm instead of new 
dependencies that require remedies. 
Dissertation Goals and Specific Research Questions 
This dissertation addresses the above problems by examining the IORs of entrepreneurial 
firms. Firms engage in IORs to gain access to resources that they currently lack (e.g., Meyer, 
Estrin, Bhaumik, & Peng, 2009).  Entrepreneurial firms are especially likely to be dependent 
upon others for critical resources needed for survival and growth as they are often unable to 
create or acquire such resources organically (Daily, McDougall, Covin, & Dalton, 2002). For 
example, access to outside capital leads to growth, as firms gain the flexibility to hire additional 
employees or increase R&D spending (Baum & Silverman, 2004; Columbo & Grilli, 2010). 
Additionally, entrepreneurial firms rarely possess all the resources required for operations (Katila 
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et al., 2008). For example, manufacturing facilities are very costly and typically take multiple 
years to build (Park, Chen, & Gallagher, 2002). Such facilities are critical resources for 
entrepreneurial firms, as manufacturing resources allow for greater control over the 
manufacturing process (Park et al., 2002) and lead to higher firm performance (Zahra & George, 
1999). Entrepreneurial firms may also lack marketing resources, which provide the ability to 
enter new markets (Koka & Prescott, 2008), or access to additional brands and products 
(Kalaignanam, Shankar, & Varadarajan 2007). Resources such as these are shown to not be 
interchangeable (Ozmel, Robinson, & Stuart, 2013), suggesting that entrepreneurial firms may 
seek any or all of them depending on their specific dependencies.  
In order to contribute to theory that explains and predicts the relationship between 
dependence remedies, autonomy, and firm performance, this dissertation examines how types of 
resource dependence are remedied and the outcomes of such remedies. Overall, this dissertation 
seeks to better explain and predict the relationship between resource dependence remedies and 
firm performance by investigating IORs that grant access to different types of resources, how 
those varied resources provide autonomy to the firm, and how that autonomy affects firm 
performance. Additionally, the ability of complementary resources to provide benefits in IORs, 
as opposed to creating new dependences (Pfeffer, 1987) is evaluated. In doing so, contributions 
and clarification are provided to resource dependence theory.  
Considering the different types of resources, remedies, and characteristics of autonomy 
previously discussed, research questions relating to how entrepreneurial firms remedy 
dependencies will now be developed. Each research question follows the previous arguments 
regarding problems present in resource dependence theory. The first question focuses on types of 
resource dependence. Firms facing dependencies utilize several different strategies to remedy 
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dependence and (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). For example, firms utilize joint ventures (Pfeffer & 
Nowak, 1976), mergers and acquisitions, (Pfeffer, 1972b), alliances (Barringer & Harrison, 
2000), and the board of directors (Pfeffer, 1972c) in attempts to reduce dependence. However, 
research has primarily focused on the strategies themselves, rather than the resources being 
sought.  While some scholars examine dependencies based on alliance types (Das, Sen, & 
Sengupta, 1998) and resources types (Katila et al., 2008), little theoretical development of 
specific types of dependence has occurred. The need for such examination is apparent, as 
outcomes have been shown to differ depending on the type of resource sought (Katila et al., 
2008) and the manner in which the resource is acquired (Das et al., 1998). Therefore, the first 
research question asks:  
 
1: How are different resource dependencies remedied? 
 
 The next research question seeks to further explain the varying relationship between 
resource dependence remedies and firm performance (Drees & Huegens, 2013). Entrepreneurial 
firms require resources for growth and survival (Daily et al., 2002) and thus are likely to seek 
remedies that lead to performance. However, RDT suggests that firm attempts to remedy 
dependencies are not guided by rational decision processes, and so may or may not result in the 
intended consequence (i.e., higher performance) (Pfeffer, 1987). Indeed, research finds both 
positive (e.g., Luo & Park, 2004) and negative (e.g., Koka & Prescott, 2008) relationships 
between remedies and firm performance. This begs the question of how different types of 
dependence remedies are related to performance. Thus, the second research question asks:  
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2: How are different resource dependence remedies related to performance? 
  
 Autonomy is considered a key construct in RDT (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and 
IORs in general (Oliver, 1991a). However, research has failed to develop autonomy in a 
meaningful way. Oliver (1991a) proposed that autonomy has a positive relationship with firm 
performance, stemming from three distinct sources. Autonomy allows a firm to (1) meet the 
demands of multiple external actors simultaneously, (2) respond to unforeseen contingencies, 
and/or (3) avoid opportunistic behavior on the part of other parties. Scholars have investigated 
autonomy in a wide variety of contexts, such as network effects (Uzzi, 1999), avoiding 
dependence on powerful actors (Peng & Luo, 2000), and internal control of the firm (Stearns & 
Mizruchi, 1986). These varying uses of autonomy suggest a lack of consensus regarding an 
important theoretical construct. As previously discussed, resource dependence is proposed to 
possess different characteristics depending on the type of resource being sought. It is unlikely 
that such differences will lead to autonomy in similar manners. Given the various treatments of 
autonomy in the literature, autonomy also appears likely to possess different characteristics 
depending on the resource sought by the firm. These largely unexplored differences in autonomy 
lead to the third research question. 
 
3. How does autonomy affect the relationship between dependence remedies and 
performance? 
 
Assumptions in RDT suggest that firms undertaking dependence remedies will also 
create new dependencies, effectively trading one set of dependencies for another (Pfeffer, 1987). 
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However, firms may instead be able to create joint dependence, causing firms to work together 
for mutual benefit rather than attempting to impose their will on each other (Gulati & Sytch, 
2007). Given that such IORs may be characterized by joint dependence insofar as both parties 
are mutually dependent on each other, it begs the fourth research question, which asks:  
 
4: How can dependence remedies prevent new, negative dependencies, from forming? 
 
Organization of Dissertation 
 
This dissertation consists of seven (7) chapters. This introduction serves as the first 
chapter. Chapter I has presented and overview of the problematic issues facing research in 
resource dependence and firm performance, explained the goals of the dissertation and 
specifically stated research questions relating to resource dependence remedies, autonomy, and 
firm performance. Chapter II reviews relevant literature in the areas of RDT in general, including 
power, dependence types, IORs, autonomy, and performance. Chapter II seeks to present the 
seminal work in RDT, evaluate the current state of the literature, and identify areas in need of 
further research.  
Chapter III builds on the literature review in Chapter II, integrates theory on the role of 
complementary resources in IORs, and develops specific hypotheses that test the relationship 
between dependence remedies, autonomy, firm performance, and complementary resources. 
Nine hypotheses are developed based on the research questions expressed in Chapter I.  
Chapter IV discusses the methodology of the dissertation. It presents the research design, 
data sources, variables, operationalizations, and empirical analysis used for testing. Next, 
10 
 
Chapter V presents the results of the hypotheses given in Chapter III based on the methods 
detailed in Chapter IV.  
Chapter VI discusses the results of the analysis, their implications for management 
scholars, and the contributions of the dissertation.  Limitations are also discussed. Finally, 
Chapter VII contains the overall conclusion. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
   
While research in resource dependence has been prolific and expanded well beyond the 
original theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), many core ideas related to resource dependence 
theory are often overlooked in the literature. This development has caused one of the original 
authors of the theory to remark that it has been reduced to a “…metaphorical statement about 
organizations” (Pfeffer, 2003, p. xvi). Wry et al. (2013) examine this claim and review the 
overall impact and contributions of the original theory, as well the phenomenon investigated. 
Overall, results show that many scholars fail to consider issues related to the external 
environment and interactions between firms (Wry et al., 2013). Several unanswered questions 
remain regarding how firms remedy dependence.  
First, the autonomy of a firm is an important consideration (Oliver, 1991b). Firms facing 
power disadvantages lack autonomy, which constrains the actions they may take and causes 
dependence (Pfeffer, 1987). The extent of a firm’s dependence is related to the importance of the 
resource to the focal firm, the extent to which the resource provider has authority over resource 
distribution, and the availability of alternative substitute resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
Autonomy is shown to be a critical component in the relationship between resource dependence 
remedies and firm performance (Drees & Heugens, 2013), but is often overlooked in the 
literature (Wry et al., 2013).  
Second, research examining remedies for dependence often focus on the structure of the 
inter-organizational relationship (IOR) used as a remedy, while ignoring the type of resource 
sought. For example, studies examine joint ventures (e.g., McCann, 1991) or the board of 
directors (e.g., Lynall, Golden, & Hillman, 2003). A focus on the structure of the IOR is relevant, 
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but there are important issues related to the type of resource sought. Katila, Rosenberg, and 
Eisenhardt (2008) find that the scarcity of a resource and level of commitment required to obtain 
it produces different decisions by firms regarding how to access such resources. Examination of 
the commitment and type of resource sought may help shed additional light on the relationship 
between resource dependence remedies and performance.    
 Finally, entrepreneurial firms may be especially vulnerable to resource dependency 
(Daily, McDougall, Covin, & Dalton, 2002). As entrepreneurial firms tend to be younger and 
smaller, they likely lack the resources needed to grow and succeed (Lynall, Golden, & Hillman, 
2003). Firms seek resources from other firms in the external environment (e.g., Baum & 
Silverman, 2004) to overcome such a liability of smallness (Aldrich & Auster, 1996). However, 
a lack of resources creates situations in which entrepreneurial firms may lack bargaining power, 
making it difficult to overcome resource dependencies. Indeed, firms seeking remedies may 
simply trade one dependency for another (Pfeffer, 1987), face power disadvantages that reduce 
firm performance (e.g., Gulati & Sytch, 2007), or control by IOR partners (e.g., Mizruchi, 1996). 
 This chapter progresses as follows. First, this chapter presents an overview of theories 
that are frequently used in the literature to predict and explain firm behavior and outcomes 
related to environmental dependence and remedies. Second, the literature on environmental 
dependence and the remedies for such dependence will be reviewed. The purpose of this review 
is to evaluate the existing research and identify potential research deficiencies that deserve future 
study.  
Theoretical Explanations 
Resource Dependence Theory 
Resource dependence theory was developed to explain how organizations influence other 
organizations in the external environment, and what may be done to manage the environment 
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(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Pfeffer (1987) explicitly presented the underlying assumptions for 
resource dependence. First, organizations are the fundamental units of analysis in the study of 
intercorporate relations and society. Second, organizations are constrained by environments 
comprised of interdependent organizations, causing a lack of autonomy. Third, organizational 
survival and success are uncertain due to the unforeseeable actions of interdependent 
organizations. Fourth, organizations will seek to reduce or remedy interdependencies. However, 
these actions are likely to create new interdependent situations, suggesting that some level of 
interdependence will always be present. Lastly, dependence and interdependence dictate both 
inter-organizational and intra-organizational power. This power then affects the actions of the 
organization. The integration of theory about interdependent organizations and power allows for 
predictions about organizational responses (Wry, Cobb, & Aldrich, 2013).   
Based on these assumptions, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) explain the task of organization 
management as the management of a coalition that ensures the survival of the organization. The 
coalition is made up of actors both inside and outside the focal organization. Interdependence 
between the coalition and focal organization can be beneficial when actors work together for 
mutual benefit but is difficult when there are conflicting and competing demands from coalition 
members (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). These demands can cause dependence, which is a factor of 
three things: the importance of the resource to the focal firm, the extent to which the resource 
provider has authority over resource distribution, and the availability of alternative substitute 
resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). These ideas build upon earlier work in power (Emerson, 
1962) and organizational environments (Thompson, 1967) that describe interactions between 
actors.  
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Emerson’s (1962) theory of power relations incorporated power, authority, legitimacy, 
and power structures into one theory. Emerson defines power as the amount of resistance by 
actor B that actor A can overcome. The relational aspect of each actors’ power over the other 
makes the insight novel for its time. Emerson notes that the power of A over B does not 
necessarily cancel out the power of B over A, as this power may not be balanced. For example, a 
business owner and key employee may have power over the other. However, the relationship 
may be unbalanced if the employee has made threats to leave the business without notice and the 
owner has no viable alternative to replace the employee.  
Thompson (1967) continued research in power by raising the level of analysis to the 
organization. Organizations aim to shield or insulate a technical "core" from uncertainty in the 
environment. By instituting systems that control resources, organizations can effectively create 
contingencies for uncertainty and optimally exploit their technological advantage. Thompson 
(1967) explains the process of managing external contingencies as ‘bridging” and suggests that 
alliances, joint ventures, mergers, and cooptation are some of the available tools for managing 
such contingencies. Indeed, many of these tools are used by Pfeffer and colleagues to explain 
remedies for resource dependence (Pfeffer 1972b; Pfeffer & Nowak, 1976; Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978).  
  Pfeffer also contributed early empirical results and theoretical development to power 
issues stemming from three separate types of interdependence (1972b; 1972c). First, symbiotic 
interdependence exists between firms in a buyer and supplier relationship. In this case, 
interdependence causes uncertainty related to necessary inputs and maintaining important 
customers. Second, competitive interdependence exists between two firms engaged in similar 
businesses and competing for the same customers. Uncertainty then stems from the competition 
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present in their environment, as firms are unsure about the actions of their rivals. Lastly, firms 
may diversify to move away from previous interdependencies.   
The primary focus of the RDT literature is investigating action taken by organizations to 
remedy dependence. One remedy involves utilizing the board of directors to bring various 
benefits to the firm.  Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) propose that directors bring four benefits to an 
organization that can help remedy dependence. First, directors bring valuable information in the 
form of advice and counsel related to firm activities (e.g., Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Second, 
directors provided access to information external to the organization through their personal 
relationships (e.g., Hillman, 2005). Third, the same relationships could bring preferential access 
to resources (e.g., Mizruchi & Stearns, 1994). Finally, directors could add legitimacy to an 
organization (e.g., Certo, Daily, & Dalton, 2001). 
Firms may also remedy dependencies by utilizing alliances and joint ventures to gain 
access to resources (Bae & Gargiulo, 2004). Alliances help firms avoid uncertainty present in the 
external environment, seek out cooperation (Steensma, Marino, Weaver, & Dickson, 2000), and 
reduce interdependence (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999).  In general, firms prefer the lower 
commitment level of a joint venture or alliance, compared to the higher commitment required for 
a merger or acquisition (Folta, 1998). However, higher commitments are sometimes required to 
access scarce resources. Mergers and acquisitions also allow firms to access needed resources 
but require a higher commitment than the more temporary nature of alliances or joint ventures. 
Pfeffer (1972b) began work in mergers through the lens of resource dependence, finding that 
interdependence between firms is likely to lead to a merger, which then reduces interdependence 
(Pfeffer, 1972b). Mergers are used to reduce symbiotic interdependence resulting from buyer-
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supplier relationships, competitive interdependence resulting from the actions of rival firms, and 
for diversification purposes (Pfeffer, 1972b; Finkelstein, 1997).  
Resource-Based Theory 
 The resource-based view (RBV) of the firm states that firms gain a competitive 
advantage when the resources they control are valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable 
(Barney, 1991). The RBV proposes that resources are developed internally (Barney, 1991), but 
resources can also be accessed externally through various types of alliances (Das & Teng, 2000). 
Entrepreneurial firms, which typically lack the internal resources required for firm growth and 
survival, are especially likely to seek necessary resources externally (Alvarez & Busenitz, 2001). 
Firms whose resources are immobile and non-substitutable are more likely to seek out other 
necessary resources through alliances (Das & Teng, 2000). Das and Teng (2000) further propose 
that firms seeking resources from alliances benefit when resources match in a particular way. 
Alliances between firms with similar resources, or with dissimilar resources that are 
complementary to each other are proposed to increase performance (Das & Teng, 2000).  
 While early research in the RBV (Barney, 1991) focused on strategic management and 
used entrepreneurship mostly as a context, additional research demonstrates that the RBV can 
provide a clear lens to predict and explain how entrepreneurs and their firms create 
heterogeneous resource bundles (Alvarez & Busenitz, 2001). Alvarez and Busenitz (2001) 
explain that the RBV applies to entrepreneurship by defining the opportunity-seeking behavior 
and resource organization capabilities of firms as resources. Applying the RBV to 
entrepreneurial firms seeking external remedies for dependence can explain how resources are 
involved in the formation of such remedies. Firms possessing complementary resources are more 
likely to create economic value (Alvarez & Barney, 2001). However, the RBV may overlook the 
relational aspect of the remedies (Alvarez & Barney, 2001). For example, the size difference 
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between large, established firms and entrepreneurial firms can result in unenforceable contracts 
and the exploitation of the entrepreneurial firm by the larger firm (Lu & Beamish, 2006). Firms 
whose resources are rare, valuable, inimitable, and non-substitutable are less to face highly 
dependent situations, as they already possess critical resources needed for survival. However, 
firms seeking such resources may face dependence, as options for accessing such resources are 
likely to be limited, and firms controlling them are likely to have strong bargaining power. 
Alvarez and Barney (2001) succinctly describe the benefit of resource acquisition and the 
potential drawbacks associated. One interviewed firm, near bankruptcy, entered into an 
agreement worth $5 million dollars in revenue from a large partner, saving the firm. Conversely, 
another firm described how their larger partner gained access to their technology and 
commercialized it without them, leaving their employees out of work and the firm bankrupt 
(Alvarez & Barney, 2001). While these issues are ignored in some RBV studies, another stream 
of the literature focuses on the relational aspects of resources. 
 Dyer and Singh (1998) explain how firms may gain a competitive advantage by working 
together in IORs to generate relational rent. Relational rent represents returns from the use of a 
production factor that is greater than the next-best use of that factor (Peteraf, 1994). Trading 
partners are more likely to generate relational rents when they possess relation-specific assets, 
utilize knowledge-sharing routines, identify and access complementary resources between firms, 
and engage in effective governance (Dyer & Singh, 1998). Lavie (2006) expands on this 
relational view by considering firms in alliance networks. In addition to the relational rent 
described by Dyer and Singh (1998), firms may benefit from inbound spillover rent gained 
through opportunistic behavior toward an alliance partner. More specifically, firms may seek to 
understand the advantages possessed by an alliance partner and use that knowledge for their 
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gain. Firms may also lose outbound spillover rent when alliance partners behave in such ways 
towards the focal firm (Lavie, 2006). The concept of relational rents runs counter to some 
assumptions and recommendations of resource dependence theory, as they infer that all firms 
may not have conflicting goals and that the primary goal of firms may not be to increase the 
dependence of other firms. In such cases, firms may successfully remedy dependence by 
correctly identifying IOR partners that will also seek relational rents and work for the benefit of 
both firms. However, spillover rents suggest that opportunism remains, that dependence may still 
occur and that both positive and negative outcomes of IORs are possible. 
Institutional Theory 
 Institutional theory is largely concerned with legitimacy, whereby firms adopt the formal 
structures and norms of other firms in the environment (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Such structures 
and norms are typically accepted as necessary without consideration regarding their effect on the 
operations of a firm. As these structures and norms are backed by public opinion, a lack of 
legitimacy that can be a threat to the survival of the firm (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), and young 
firms may lack legitimacy due to a liability of newness (Stichcombe, 1965). Pfeffer and Salancik 
(1978) suggest that a lack of legitimacy is one form of dependence and that firms seeking to 
remedy a lack of legitimacy may do so by entering into IORs with other firms.  
 Firms can gain legitimacy by entering into an IOR with other firms that are already 
considered legitimate (Barringer & Harrison, 2000). However, such legitimizing processes can 
be a drain on financial resources, as a larger partner granting legitimacy may lower the 
profitability of an IOR. These costs then only make overall operations more difficult (Lu & 
Beamish, 2006).  
Second, the environment in which a firm operates can play a role in the legitimacy of the 
firm. For example, firms expanding internationally may suffer from a liability of foreignness 
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stemming from a lack of knowledge about the firm from individuals and groups in the local 
environment, causing a lack of legitimacy (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). A liability of foreignness 
is made up of all costs associated with doing business in a foreign country (Zaheer, 1995), 
suggesting that there are both direct expenses and indirect costs involved.  One remedy for this 
lack of legitimacy is to partner with a domestic firm in the host country (Lu & Beamish, 2006), 
thereby gaining legitimacy by associating with an already legitimate firm (Barringer & Harrison, 
2000). Firms also may or may not be granted legitimacy from the institutional environment in 
which they operate. For example, foreign firms may be considered legitimate by potential 
investors when their home country has strong legal protections in place (Bell, Moore, & 
Filatotchev, 2012). Such legitimacy may improve the success of a remedy for dependence on 
financial resources.  
Research suggests that legitimacy may improve or hinder firm performance. Legitimacy 
gained through IORs may reduce real costs (Zaheer, 1995), suggesting that it may improve 
performance. Conversely, such IORs may also be costly (Lu & Beamish, 2006), suggesting that 
performance may suffer. Overall, legitimacy is not found to be a factor in the relationship 
between resource dependence remedies and performance (Drees & Heugens, 2013). Legitimacy 
may perhaps be related to the effectiveness of remedies, rather than a remedy itself (e.g., Bell et 
al., 2012).  
Agency Theory 
 Agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) broadly describes the relationship between 
principals, who own firms, and agents, who manage them. The relationship is further described 
as being contractual in nature, and agency theory thus defines the firm as a nexus of contracts 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Agency theory attempts to remedy two issues relating to the 
principal-agent relationship. First, the goals of principals and agents may not always coincide, 
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and the principal typically has imperfect information available to monitor the agent. Second, risk 
plays a key role, as principals and agents may have different levels of risk tolerance. Agency 
theory specifies that these problems can be remedied through the efficient use of contracts 
between principals and agents (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). While agency theory may often 
describe remedies for the aforementioned principal-agent problem, it also describes relationships 
between the board of directors and the firm when the board is utilized to remedy dependence on 
financial resources.  
 Agency theory describes aspects of financial remedies brought upon by IORs between 
firms and financial institutions. Firms are shown to appoint members of financial institutions to 
the board of directors to gain access to financing (Mizruchi & Steans, 1994). This is especially 
true for firms seeking financing from venture capital firms, as firms exchange equity and board 
of director positions for financing that can be used to grow and develop the firm (Park & 
Steensma, 2014). In either instance, these board members may provide monitoring or additional 
resource provision through their advice and counsel (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003).  
 Like institutional theory, agency theory’s role in resource dependence often reflects 
aspects of a remedy that effect the success of the remedy. For example, some studies find that 
boards engaging in monitoring the firm may have no effect or even lower firm performance 
(Kroll, Walters, & Le, 2007; Wijbenga, Postma, & Stratling, 2007). However, another proposes 
that monitoring has an inverted-U shaped relationship with performance (Garg, 2013). Each of 
these studies examines the role of directors who are appointed as part of a remedy for financial 
dependence.  
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Signaling Theory 
 Signaling theory describes how information about ambiguous or difficult to observe 
characteristics can be communicated through visible external signals (Spence, 1973). Signals are 
sent from parties with more information to other parties with less information when those parties 
are involved in a transaction of some kind (Spence, 2002).  When a signal is successfully sent 
and received it can work to minimize information asymmetry between people or groups, and 
ideally identifies the signaling party as higher in quality or superior to parties that do not signal 
(Spence, 2002). For example, in Spence’s (1973) original study, job seekers signaled their 
quality by obtaining a college education and reporting it to firms as they sought employment. 
Signals themselves do not necessarily remedy dependence but convey information to other 
parties that influence the effectiveness of a dependence remedy. 
Signals are often sent by firms to potential investors in an attempt to improve the 
outcome of financial remedies. For example, signals are used by firms and prospective investors 
to determine the value of the firm (Certo, Daily, & Dalton, 2001). The presence of outside 
members on the board of directors or board leadership that is separate from firm leadership 
signals firm quality to potential investors, which may increase the effectiveness of financial 
dependence remedies (Certo et al., 2001). Additionally, independent boards of directors are 
shown to help attract key stakeholders by signaling that board monitoring is taking place 
(Deutsch & Ross, 2003). Signals can also be in the form of IORs, such as how Park and Mezias 
(2005) describe alliance announcements as signals about actual firm action, as opposed to 
rumors, to investors. However, signals may not always be effective. As signals are not a standard 
or clear form of communication, issues may arise with their use. Park and Mezias (2005) also 
show that signals can vary regarding their strength and their meaning, possibly creating 
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additional confusion or information asymmetry rather than clarifying uncertainty regarding firm 
survival.  
 Firms may also use relationships with prestigious organizations to signal a strong 
reputation and access to resources (Honig, Lerner, & Raban, 2006). Signaling in such a way can 
increase a firm’s ability to secure outside investors and to increase performance (Honig et al., 
2006). In this manner, signaling theory is similar to institutional theory, in that signals are 
attempting to relay legitimacy (Certo, 2003). In a similar manner to affiliations with legitimate 
firms (Honig et al., 2006), a prestigious board of directors may signal the quality of the firm 
(Certo et al., 2001). Indeed, a prestigious board described by signaling theory and affiliations 
with legitimate firms described by institutional theory may be used to describe the same 
phenomenon: the appointment of prestigious outside board members to the board of a firm 
seeking legitimacy.   
Transaction Cost Economics 
 Transaction Cost Economics’ (TCE) focuses on transactions between organizations, and 
how the costs associated with such transactions varies across different types of organizational 
forms (Williamson, 1975). Williamson explains that cost minimization drives the manner in 
which firms handle transactions (1991). As such, firms may choose transactions through market, 
hybrid, or hierarchal governance forms. Market transactions are arms-length transactions. Firms 
engaging in market transactions are not dependent on one another, as the transaction is likely 
easily made and multiple alternatives are likely available. Hybrid forms of transaction 
governance involve commitments between firms, as contracts are used to bind the behavior of 
firms. These agreements also describe what ranges of divergence from the specific agreement 
can be remedied, what information must be disclosed, and typically utilizes arbitration to settle 
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disagreements rather than the court system. Hierarchy governance refers to the internalization of 
the transaction. Rather than engaging with another firm to secure a resource, firms decide to 
produce the resource themselves, sometimes through the acquisition of another firm. 
Acquisitions eliminate the need for contract law or the use of courts, as internal firm rules and 
procedures can be used to dictate the terms of production (Williamson, 1985; Williamson, 1991).  
 Firms choose a form of transaction governance based on three characteristics relating to 
the transaction (Williamson, 1991). First, the asset specificity of the transaction describes the 
flexibility of assets used in the transaction. Specifically, assets that are only usable for one 
specific transaction are considered highly specific, while assets that may be used for numerous 
transactions are considered to have low asset specificity. Second, uncertainty plays a role in the 
choice of governance form but does so according to the level of asset specificity required. 
Williamson (1985) explains that low asset specificity likely leads to market governance 
regardless of the uncertainty since firms can easily find new transaction partners if necessary. 
However, when a significant level of asset specificity is coupled with uncertainty, firms are 
likely to choose hybrid or hierarchy governance in order to reduce the risk involved with market 
transactions that can vary substantially from traction to transaction (Williamson, 1985). The very 
highest levels of uncertainty, however, are likely to produce either market or hierarchal 
governance. In this case, market-based governance allows for greater flexibility, and hierarchy 
allows for decisions to be made without other firms. Market and hierarchy are thus better suited 
for situation characterized by high uncertainty, as hybrid forms are not likely to provide either 
the flexibility to adapt or certainty that firms seek (Williamson, 1991). Lastly, the frequency of 
the transaction can also determine governance forms much like uncertainty. Transactions that 
frequently occur, coupled with asset specificity, push firms to hierarchy governance, as 
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monitoring costs may otherwise by too high. Infrequent transactions are likely to lead to market 
governance, as forming hierarchal governance is likely to be very costly (Williamson, 1985).  
Overall, the theories outlined above seek to explain the actions of firms seeking remedies 
for dependence on various resources. Some approaches, such as resource dependence theory 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), relational aspects of RBV (Lavie, 2006), and TCE approaches that 
consider opportunism (e.g., Joshi & Stump, 1999) offer mechanisms with which to explain the 
social aspect of IORs that seek to remedy dependence. Other theories typically focus more on the 
overall value and importance of the resource acquired, such as the traditional RBV (Barney, 
1991). Institutional theory (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) tends to recognize the social aspect of IORs 
when considering legitimacy, but often ignores the quality of the IOR or any tangible resource 
acquired. Signaling theory offers explanations regarding why some remedies may be more 
successful than others, but may not consider if the remedy being sought is the best strategy for 
the firm. Agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) sheds light on how IORs built through the 
board of directors can incentivize actions that benefit the firm, but makes various assumptions 
regarding the behavior of directors that are challenged by other scholars (e.g., Core, Holthausen, 
& Larcker, 1999). To best understand the potential contributions of each of these theories and the 
overall literature addressing remedies for resource dependence, autonomy, and performance, a 
systematic review of the literature is conducted.  
Review of Dependence Remedies, Autonomy, and Performance 
Extensive research, utilizing numerous theories as described above, examines resource 
dependence, remedies for dependence, autonomy, and performance outcomes since Pfeffer and 
colleagues brought mainstream attention to the subject in the 1970s. However, uncertainty still 
exists regarding the relationship between dependence remedies, autonomy, and performance 
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(Drees & Heugens, 2013). Additionally, entrepreneurial firms are known to face challenges 
relating to a lack of resources necessary for the survival of the firm, but questions remain 
regarding the potential rewards and drawbacks to seeking resources in the external environment 
(e.g., Hallen et al., 2014). To assess the overall findings on dependence remedies, autonomy, and 
performance in entrepreneurship, the review process of other published entrepreneurship reviews 
is followed (e.g., Busenitz et al., 2003; Shepherd, Williams, & Patzel, 2015; Marvel, Davis, & 
Sproul, 2016). Articles included meet the following criteria: (1) publication in a top-tier 
management journal or entrepreneurship-specific journal. Management journals include 
Academy of Management Journal, Academy of Management Review, Administrative Science 
Quarterly, Journal of Management, Journal of Management Studies, Journal of International 
Business Studies, Management Science, Organization Science, and Strategic Management 
Journal. Entrepreneurship journals include Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Journal of 
Business Venturing, Journal of Small Business Management, Strategic Entrepreneurship 
Journal, Small Business Economics, and Entrepreneurship and Regional Development; and (2) 
Keywords include one of: entrepreneur(s), entrepreneurial, entrepreneurship, founder(s), 
opportunity, opportunities, (new) venture, start-up, or startup, AND any of the keywords 
alliance(s), merger(s), acquisition(s), joint venture(s), board(s) of directors, director interlock(s), 
board composition, inter-organizational relationship, or bridging, AND any of the keywords 
autonomy, performance, or success. Following Shepherd et al. (2015), the term “small business” 
is not included, as small businesses may be entrepreneurial, but being a small business does not 
necessarily make the firm entrepreneurial (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). Using ABI/Inform 
Complete, this search produces 275 articles. To best understand the theoretical and empirical 
contributions to the literature, teaching cases, editorials, review articles, meta-analyses, and 
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spurious results are removed. A majority of studies found in the search results do not relate to the 
specific literature being reviewed due to certain keywords being used in multiple literatures, 
producing numerous results dealing with established firms or unrelated phenomena.1 This 
reduces the total number of articles to 93. 
Remedies, Autonomy, and Outcomes in Table 2.1 
Table 2.1 contains all the articles reviewed and the material relevant to the research 
questions presented in Chapter I of this dissertation, including the basis and structure of the 
remedy used for dependence, the classification and treatment (if any) of autonomy, and the 
theoretical lens of the study. Examining these issues provides an overall understanding of the 
literature in environmental dependence and uncovers several key findings. The next sections 
present a more detailed discussion of the findings in Table 2.1 and progress as follows. First, 
remedies for dependence will be discussed according to the structure of the remedy and then the 
type of remedy. Second, the literature describing the relationship between remedies and 
performance is presented. Finally, the role of autonomy in dependence remedies and the 
relationship between autonomy and performance will be discussed. 
Joint Ventures and Alliances 
 Firms engage in joint ventures and alliances with other firms to gain access to resources 
in the external environment and attempt to remedy dependencies (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
However, early research on alliances between firms finds little to no benefit accruing to firms in 
                                                            
1 Use of the term “venture” produces numerous articles about joint ventures that are irrelevant for this review and 
otherwise absent in the search results. Including the term is necessary, though, to capture many relevant studies. 
For example, the phrase “new high-tech ventures” would otherwise be omitted from results, but is relevant for 
this review. Additionally, the terms “success” and “opportunity” produces several articles that are otherwise 
unrelated to the review (e.g., CEO succession), but are necessary to capture relevant studies. One retracted study 
is also eliminated (Ernst, Lichtenthaler, & Vogt, 2011). Finally, studies focusing on established businesses are also 
excluded (many of these also fall into the irrelevant results produced by the terms “venture” and “opportunity”). 
This is in line with published reviews of entrepreneurship as well as the description of entrepreneurship as 
exploiting opportunities and involving decisions about the value of resources (Shane & Venkatraman, 2000). 
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the alliance. While alliances and joint ventures are found to be most frequently used for 
accessing new markets and distribution channels (McCann, 1991), research also finds no 
relationship between IORs and performance (Golden & Dollinger, 1993) and that new ventures 
outperform joint ventures (Woodcock, Beamish, & Makino, 1994). Bantel (1998) also examines 
firms utilizing alliances as a form of strategy, finding very few positive results. Firms utilizing 
alliances as the main component of their strategy are found to compete in mature product 
markets, produce low levels of growth and market development, and are inefficient. Overall, 
Bantel (1998) finds these firms lacking in a clear strategy and having poor prospects.  However, 
early non-findings and negative findings are contradicted by additional research that 
demonstrates benefits accruing to entrepreneurial firms engaging in alliances.    
Entrepreneurial firms must typically focus on specific goals or possess certain 
characteristics to benefit from alliances or joint ventures. For example, Larson (1991) finds that 
entrepreneurial firms partnering together benefit from information exchange, joint forecasting, 
collaborative R&D, and improved innovation. Alliances providing such benefits to 
entrepreneurial firms are considered to be highly salient resources for the development of the 
firm (Lichenstein & Brush, 2001). Multiple studies examine one or more of these aspects of 
alliances. Baum and Silverman (2004) examine several firm characteristics and their relationship 
with the firm’s ability to acquire venture capital. Results suggest that firms engaging in alliances, 
as well as possessing higher levels of human capital, increase the likelihood of acquiring venture 
capital (Baum & Silverman, 2004). Alliances are also shown to improve financial performance. 
For example, social capital in the form of linkages between entrepreneurs and the Israeli military 
defense leads to higher sales revenue (Honig et al., 2006).  Firms also seek alliances to remedy 
several internal and external challenges. Firms with less financial slack, lower numbers of 
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products in their pipeline, lower quality scientific teams, weaker patent positions, higher 
competitive environments, or less attractive financing environments seek of alliances to 
overcome these challenges (Patzelt, Shepherd, Deeds, & Bradley, 2008). 
  Entrepreneurial firms may also participate in multiple alliances simultaneously. Alliance 
networks constitute all current firm alliances and research finds numerous benefits related to 
alliance networks. Baum, Calabrese, and Silverman (2000) investigate the scope and efficiency 
of alliance networks present at firm founding. Results suggest that efficiently organized networks 
provide inexpensive and easier access to information and capabilities. Firms seeking alliances 
with rivals may also gain additional learning opportunities and reduce potential future threats 
(Baum et al., 2000). Indeed, Koka and Prescott (2008) show that entrepreneurial alliance 
networks based on information brokerage and access to diverse information outperform 
prominent alliance networks consisting of affiliations with other prominent firms after regulatory 
change. Alliance networks also provide access to resources, as firms may also be able to access 
new markets provided by an alliance partner (Koka & Prescott, 2008), or reduce the time to IPO 
when a larger network is present (Sea, 2004). 
Firms in alliance networks may also influence other firms due to their position in the 
network. Scholars examining network position often focus on structural holes. Structural holes 
are network positions that allow for the brokerage of resources between other members of the 
network (Burt, 1997). Entrepreneurial teams that reside in structural holes of their network are 
shown to lead to venture performance, and can also be a complement for functional diversity 
(Vissa & Chacar, 2009). Lechner and Leyronas (2012) also examine structural holes present in 
alliance networks. Results suggest that firms can utilize structural holes to access the resources 
present in a regional cluster, leading to firm performance. Relatedly, firms located in central 
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network positions also receive benefits from their network position. Network centrality is shown 
to have a positive and direct effect on new product performance (Soh, 2003), and to moderate the 
relationship between EO and firm performance (Stam & Elfring, 2008). In this context, repeated 
partnerships are also positively related to new product performance (Soh, 2003), and bridging 
ties also moderate the relationship between EO and firm performance (Stam & Elfring, 2008). In 
related work, Ozcan and Eisenhardt (2009) examine firm networks, showing that firms can take a 
proactive approach to reducing dependence by organizing around key industry structures. Firms 
able to stake out a central location in a network and create multiple ties around uncertainty in an 
industry create better performing individual ties (Ozcan & Eisenhardt, 2009). 
Entrepreneurial firms also seek alliances in international contexts. Some early research on 
joint ventures and alliances examine these IORs in transition and developing countries. Artisien 
and Buckley (1985) conduct an exploratory study of firms entering into joint ventures in 
Yugoslavia. Results show that Western firms partnering with Yugoslavian firms sought growth 
and profits, but did not report the realization of profits. D’Souza and McDougall (1989) present 
one possible explanation for the achievement of growth but not profits.  Joint ventures in 
developing countries are said to lead to performance when there is fit between the needs of the 
country and the resource advantages of the entering firm (D’Souza &McDougall, 1989). 
International alliances can also lead to growth in transition economies, but in this case, domestic 
firms experience growth when they can produce low-cost and high-quality products (Malo & 
Norus, 2009). Performance in transition economies is also shown to require commitment and 
cooperation between firms that have not traditionally engaged in such behaviors (Fink & Harris, 
2012).   Research often finds that international alliances are beneficial when knowledge is 
obtained. For example, international alliances with local partners can provide the local 
30 
 
knowledge needed to remedy a lack of resources and capabilities when expanding internationally 
(Lu & Beamish, 2001). The host country experience of local partners helps firms overcome a 
liability of foreignness and increases profitability in international joint ventures, but decreases 
their longevity as the international partner gains their local knowledge (Lu & Beamish, 2006).  
Acquiring new knowledge in the form of technical skills, managerial skills, or knowledge of 
product or market development is shown to lead to overall firm performance in international 
outsourcing arrangements (Li, Wei, & Liu, 2010). Entrepreneurial orientation also benefits firm 
performance in specific foreign markets, particularly when firm capabilities match the resource 
sought in the alliance (Brouthers, Nakos, & Dimitratos, 2014). However, not all international 
alliances are productive. Firms seeking product innovation are shown to experience negative 
performance when engaging in a strategic alliance for product development, as international 
partners from transition economies likely lack the experience to capitalize on such a relationship 
(Li & Atuahene-Gima, 2001).  
Mergers and Acquisitions 
 Firms entering into alliances or joint ventures to secure resources may also choose to 
acquire resources by acquiring or merging with other firms. While entrepreneurial firms are less 
likely to acquire other firms simply due to their size and lack of resources, mergers and 
acquisitions are still notable phenomena. In an examination of causes of firm growth, Fusser and 
Willard (1990) find that high-growth firms are more likely to have originated in business 
incubators and that high and low growth firms do not differ in making acquisitions. While 
entrepreneurial firms may not acquire many firms, they are often targets of acquisitions. These 
acquisitions produce synergies that may otherwise be unavailable due to the size and scope of 
entrepreneurial forms (Brush, 1996). Acquired firms are likely to increase their market share as 
31 
 
they gain operational synergy with their acquirer. If acquired firms are also able to gain financial 
synergies, those synergies are likely to create greater value than operational synergies (Brush, 
1996). Further, synergies are likely to be found when firm resources are complementary, rather 
than similar (Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 2001). The combination of complementary 
resources may create valuable and unique synergy, opportunities for learning, the development 
of new capabilities, and sustainable competitive advantages (Harrison et al., 2001). 
Board of Director Interlocks and Composition 
 Entrepreneurial firms often remedy financial dependence by exchanging equity and board 
of directors seats in exchange for funding needed to grow the firm (Nelson, 2003). This 
phenomenon receives considerable attention from scholars seeking to understand the effects of 
funding and the additional resources that can be utilized through such relationships. While early 
research simply sought to determine the role of boards in venture capital backed firms, finding 
that such boards are more likely to be involved in the formation and evaluation of the firm 
(Fried, Bruton, & Hisrich, 1998), research quickly advanced to more specific topics. 
 Board size, which receives considerable attention in the strategy literature (e.g., Dalton, 
Daily, Johnson, & Ellstrand, 1999), is also studied in the entrepreneurial context. Daily and 
Dalton (1993) find that firms with more directors overall and more outside directors’ experience 
higher sales revenue and growth, as these directors bring access to resources in the external 
environment. Board size is also associated with IPO performance, as larger boards signal firm 
quality and help to prevent IPO underpricing (Certo et al., 2001). 
 The composition of the board of directors also affects and is affected by several firm 
characteristics. Powerful CEOs are proposed to appoint board members for resource needs, while 
financiers are proposed to appoint members for institutional or agency reasons. As such, board 
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composition can be heavily influenced by the firm’s situation at founding, reflecting the goals of 
powerful actors in the firm (Lynall, Golden, & Hillman, 2003). The presence of original top 
management team (TMT) members can also produce positive outcomes that may remedy 
financial dependence. Post-IPO firms are shown to experience higher market performance when 
original TMT members are present and external board members can provide advice and counsel 
(Kroll, Walters, & Le, 2007). Additional research suggests that boards should have a specific 
range of original TMT members on the board. Original TMT members on the board of post-IPO 
firms have an inverted-U shaped relationship with stock market returns, such that returns 
increase substantially as membership rises from 50-75%, but then decreases (Walters, Kroll, & 
Wright, 2010). 
Boards of directors are also tasked with monitoring the firm. While monitoring is not 
typically a remedy for dependence, the relationship between monitoring and performance is 
unclear and at least one study suggests that monitoring may be a resource. Kroll et al. (2007) find 
that monitoring by board members does not increase performance, but Garg (2013) argues for a 
more precise relationship. Boards with venture capital appointments in place are proposed to 
substitute for the resource provision task of directors, bringing experience and skills in 
monitoring that improves performance. An inverted-U shaped relationship between venture 
board monitoring and performance is proposed (Garg, 2013).   
Finally, boards play a key role in family firms as well. The presence of nonfamily board 
members provides access to external resources and sources of information that allow a family 
firm to expand (Arregle, Naldi, Nordqvist, & Hitt, 2012). Family firms seeking international 
expansion benefit from nonfamily board members, as nonfamily board representation has a 
positive relationship with the scale and scope of family firm internationalization (Arregle et al., 
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2012). The board can also assist with difficult leadership transitions in family firms. Outside 
board members can assist in leadership transitions by providing resources and information that 
can alleviate constraints brought about by the family tradition associated with the firm (Yoo, 
Schenkel, & Kim, 2014). Specific results show that non-first-son successors to family firms that 
interact with outside board members experience positive firm performance from doing so (Yoo 
et al., 2014). 
Overall, research finds various positive outcomes accruing to firms that engage in IORs 
to remedy dependence. As described above, significant research examines IORs and their 
outcomes in terms of the structure of the IOR. While the board of directors is frequently used to 
acquire financial resources (e.g., Daily & Dalton, 1993), alliances, joint ventures, and 
acquisitions are all used to acquire various types of non-financial resources. However, there can 
be significant differences between types of non-financial resources. For example, Cai, Hughes, 
and Yin (2014) examine the purchase, attraction, and development of resources and the effect of 
each on performance. However, firms in the sample are widely distributed in industries such as 
manufacturing, construction and real estate, computer service and software, and biology (Cai et 
al., 2014). Clearly, the purchase, attraction, or development of resources within each of those 
industries varies greatly. For example, developing real estate involves entirely different factors 
than developing computer software. Others utilize a specific industry to draw a sample (e.g., 
Gabrielsson, 2007; Zahra & Hayton, 2008; Raymond, Marchand, St-Pierre, Cadieux, & Labelle, 
2013), giving varying degrees of attention to the specific nature of the industry or resource. 
Ignoring the specific nature of resources being developed, acquired, or purchased by firms 
creates a potential problem, as different resource types in each of these industries can be 
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substantially different. The next section reviews the literature that examines resource dependence 
remedies according to the type of resource being sought. 
Remedies for Specific Resource Dependencies 
 The first column of interest in Table 2.1 considers the various types of dependence 
remedies explored in extant research. Katila et al. (2008) categorize dependencies based on the 
type of resource required by a firm. Financial resources are described as access to capital by 
newer firms that allow a firm to prosper (Katila et al., 2008). Complementary resources are 
necessary operational resources possessed by established firms, but lacking in entrepreneurial 
firms. Complementary resources are also non-financial resources not typically provided by 
investors such as venture capital or private equity firms. Additionally, results suggest that 
complementary resource dependence remedies vary in their level of commitment. In this case, 
commitment refers to the scarcity and inimitability of the resource being sought. Higher 
commitment complementary remedies describe resources such as manufacturing capabilities or 
R&D, which are costly, difficult to develop, and not widely available. Conversely, lower 
commitment complementary remedies describe resources such as marketing resources, human 
resource services, or basic supply agreements. Accordingly, the type of remedy examined within 
a particular article was classified as either (1) financial, (2) high commitment complementary, or 
(3) low commitment complementary. 
High commitment resource dependence remedies.  Entrepreneurial firms often lack 
the resources necessary to fully commercialize their products (Teece, 1986). Forming alliances to 
access high commitment resources, such as manufacturing resources, can thus remedy this 
dependence and allow firms to grow and develop. Firms are proposed to perform best in 
manufacturing alliances when working to utilize their strengths. D’Souza and McDougall (1989) 
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propose that smaller firms entering into manufacturing joint ventures may do well by seeking 
partners in developing countries. The existence of fit between the focal firm and the needs of the 
developing country and firm should lead to success for the focal firm. Joint ventures in 
developing countries may also be attractive to smaller firms as a lack of cutting-edge technology 
may not hinder the ability to find venture partners or experience success (D’Souza & 
McDougall, 1989).  
 However, empirical results do not offer an entirely clear explanation of the outcomes of 
manufacturing alliances. Partnerships between entrepreneurial firms can be a substitute for 
vertical integration, granting access to R&D and manufacturing resources that may otherwise be 
out of reach (Larson, 1991), but such results of such partnerships may be difficult to understand. 
Golden and Dollinger (1993) examine IORs between small manufacturing firms, finding no 
relationship between IORs and firm performance. Indeed, in some instances, profit margins 
decrease due to IORs. The authors speculate that IORs may be used as a form of satisficing, 
whereby partners accept a lower level of performance in exchange for higher levels of certainty 
(Golden & Dollinger, 1993). Inkpen and Crossan (1995) offer some possible explanation for 
non-findings related to IORs, finding that organizational learning in joint ventures is often 
hindered by inflexible managerial beliefs. Management that can identify gaps in knowledge and 
also adjust current beliefs when presented with new evidence is more likely to learn and benefit 
from IORs in manufacturing contexts (Inkpen & Crossan, 1995). McGee, Dowling, and 
Megginson (1995) examine similar cooperative agreements, shedding some light on other 
uncertain findings. Results show that cooperative arrangements for manufacturing and R&D 
benefit firm performance most when the founding team has manufacturing experience.  
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Manufacturing alliances are also studies in international contexts, as many emerging 
countries offer the opportunity to manufacture quality products at low prices (Malo & Norris, 
2009). Examining alliances from the view of manufacturing firms, Malo and Norris (2009) find 
that manufacturers based in transition economies are successful when forming previously 
unavailable international alliances allowing for the sale of low-cost, high-quality products. Li et 
al. (2010) also examine firms in emerging countries, focusing on manufacturers that perform 
outsourcing for firms from developed countries. As more advanced processes are outsourced 
these firms have the opportunity to learn from their foreign partners and improve performance. 
Results show that high market orientation and EO lead to knowledge acquisition, and that 
knowledge acquisition leads to firm performance (Li et al., 2010).  
Overall, while entrepreneurial firms do in fact obtain high commitment resources via 
IORs, the success of such IORs remain in question. Issues related to management beliefs (Inkpen 
& Crossan, 1995), experience (McGee et al., 1995), and the type of economy in which a firm 
resides (Li et al., 2010) all effect outcomes of IORs for high commitment resources. This wide 
range of specific contextual factors creates a challenge for understanding the general 
phenomenon.  
Low commitment resource dependence remedies. Low commitment resources 
represent resources that are important to the development of the firm but are more readily 
available and easy to access, thus requiring a lower level of commitment to be secured. One such 
resource frequently examined in the literature is marketing resources. Marketing alliances 
provide specific resources to entrepreneurial firms, typically assisting with access to new 
markets or channels of distribution that were otherwise unavailable, creating the potential for 
growth (McCann, 1991). Baum et al. (2000) describe similar resources being available through 
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downstream marketing alliances, such as market access and distribution infrastructure. Access to 
markets and means to distribute to those markets provides opportunities for the growth and 
development of the firm. Accessing such resources through marketing alliances is likely to 
increase revenue growth as well as employment and R&D spending (Baum et al., 2000).  
  Brouthers et al. (2014) examine international performance stemming from marketing 
alliances. While marketing alliances improve performance in general, results show that the 
capabilities possessed by the firm play a large role in the success of a particular alliance. Firms 
possessing marketing capabilities increased performance when engaging in marketing alliances, 
more so than firms without marketing capabilities. The same relationship is found for firms with 
research capabilities engaging in research alliances (Brouthers et al., 2014).  
One study also examines marketing relationships between local development agencies 
and entrepreneurs in their area (Izquierdo, Carrion, & Gutierrez, 2008). Relational exchange 
between agencies and entrepreneurs represents a form of social capital. In this study, firms assist 
with economic development goals in exchange for relationships with other key stakeholders, 
such as government agencies and other groups. Relational exchange with entrepreneurs is shown 
to promote the goals of local development agencies and increases firm competitiveness and 
managerial efficiency (Izquierdo et al., 2008). Ozcan and Eisenhardt (2009) find that strong ties 
between an entrepreneurial firm and a large firm reduce uncertainty and provide access to 
distribution channels that can be critical to success. Further, achieving success is found to create 
opportunities for additional alliances that access new distribution channels (Ozcan & Eisenhardt, 
2009).  
Compared to high commitment resources, research on low commitment resources 
appears to present a clearer picture of the relationship between acquiring such resources and 
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performance. Firms acquiring access to marketing resources are often available to increase 
revenues (McCann, 1991), and may find additional opportunities through the building of 
relationships (Izquierdo et al., 2008). Growing firm revenues may also allow for further 
development of the firm in other areas, such as R&D spending (Baum et al., 2000). 
Financial resource dependence remedies. Some firms can reduce the need for external 
financial resources through internal actions. For example, Levitas and McFayden (2009) find that 
patent activity and exploitation alliances decrease the need for capital. These activities tend to 
maximize profits, making firms less likely to seek financing (Levitas & McFayden, 2009). 
However, most entrepreneurial firms do require access to external capital at some point, and 
many scholars have investigated how firms attract and acquire funding. 
One stream of research studies the characteristics or actions of firms that make them 
more likely to obtain external financing. One study finds straightforward results, suggesting that 
simply offering better terms to venture capitalists and investigating numerous options improves 
the possibility of acquiring funding (Hustedde & Pulver, 1992).  However, the resources and 
actions of firms rightfully receive more attention. Human capital is found to support venture 
capital, although Baum and Silverman (2004) find that venture capitalists may over-value human 
capital, as founding team human capital is shown to have a negative or non-significant 
relationship with outcomes such as revenues and R&D expenditures (Baum & Silverman, 2004). 
Human capital is not found, however, to increase the odds of securing funding through 
crowdfunding sources (Ahlers, Cumming, Gunther, & Schweizer, 2015). Technical knowledge, 
though, is found to contribute to the acquisition of venture capital. Honig et al. (2006) find that 
firm knowledge gained through spillovers increases the chances of receiving venture capital, and 
Baum and Silverman (2004) find a similar relationship when a firm possesses patents.  
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 Research examining the relationship between alliances and the acquisition of venture 
capital also finds conflicting results based on the type of financing sought. Baum and Silverman 
(2004) find that engaging in downstream or horizontal alliances increases the likelihood of 
acquiring venture capital. However, Ahlers et al. (2015) find that alliance capital in the form of 
non-executive board members does not increase the possibility of obtaining equity 
crowdfunding.  
Entrepreneurial firms further advanced in the firm life cycle may have the option of 
conducting an Initial Public Offering (IPO) to remedy financial dependence. Several studies 
examine the success of IPOs in specific contexts. First, independent boards may be beneficial to 
family firms after an IPO. Family firms often underperform the market post-IPO, but governance 
from an independent board reduces the negative performance (Ehrhardt & Nowak, 2003). 
Second, the ethnic proximity of VCs to their funded firms is positively related to successful 
IPOs, acquisitions, and net profits after IPO (Hegde & Tumlinson, 2014). Finally, firms seeking 
an IPO in a foreign country benefit from the advice and counsel of an independent board, leading 
to a more successful IPO (Bell et al., 2012). 
While not as common as venture capital-related research, some studies examine financial 
dependence remedies in conjunction with other important events. For example, public firms are 
shown to occasionally exit public markets (Zahra, 1995). Firms exiting public markets eliminate 
the scrutiny attached to the market, but must utilize alternative financial remedies to do so. By 
utilizing leveraged buyouts, firms can increase corporate entrepreneurship and firm performance 
(Zahra, 1995). Entrepreneurs also use financial remedies to exit their firms entirely. 
Entrepreneurial age and human capital lead to different types of intended exit by the entrepreneur 
(DeTienne & Cardon, 2012). Older entrepreneurs are more likely to choose family succession or 
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liquidation, compared to a more traditional financial remedy such as an IPO or exit after 
acquisition (DeTienne & Cardon, 2012). 
Remedies and Performance 
 A recent meta-analysis by Drees and Heugens (2013) supports the idea that resource 
dependence remedies are positively related to firm performance. However, some contradictory 
findings exist (e.g., Koka & Prescott, 2008), and among positive results, not all remedies are 
shown to produce equal performance outcomes (Drees & Heugens, 2013). To help clarify the 
findings present in the literature, this section reviews the relationship between dependence 
remedies and performance. Relevant summaries are shown in the last column of Table 2.1.  
Board of Director Interlocks, Composition, and Performance 
Several studies examine performance relating to the board of directors. As boards are 
often associated with venture capital research and financial remedies, the boards’ effect on IPO 
performance is often a topic of investigation. Board independence is shown to lead to foreign 
IPO success (Bell et al., 2012), and board size helps prevent IPO underpricing (Certo et al., 
2001). Firms that have recently completed an IPO experience positive stock market returns when 
original TMT members are present on the board and receive advice from outside members (Kroll 
et al., 2007). The ratio of original TMT members on the board also affects post-IPO stock market 
returns. Returns are highest when the original TMT holds a majority of seats (over 50%), but not 
an overwhelming majority (under 75%) (Walter et al., 2010).  
  Boards also assist with financial performance. Daily and Dalton (1993) find that board 
size and higher numbers of outside directors leads to sales revenue and growth. One study 
examines financial performance as an antecedent to board behavior (i.e., Gabrielsson, 2007). 
Contrary to expected findings, strong past performance has a negative relationship with 
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monitoring and resource provision by the boards of directors. Results suggest that boards may 
avoid becoming involved when performance is strong, but feel they should intervene when 
performance is weak (Gabrielsson, 2007).  Additionally, Garg (2013) proposes that venture 
boards, boards with venture capital appointments in place, can be a substitute for the resource 
provision task of directors as they may bring experience and skills in monitoring that improve 
performance. Thus, an inverted-U shaped relationship between venture board monitoring and 
performance is proposed (Garg, 2013). Finally, outside directors can also assist firms in 
leadership transitions, providing advice to non-first-son successors in family businesses that then 
leads to performance (Yoo et al., 2014). Overall, findings suggest that skilled and experienced 
board members with the intent to improve firm performance are likely to succeed at doing so. 
 Researchers also examine non-financial performance brought on by the board of 
directors. For example, industrial firms that may pollute the environment may be dependent on 
public opinion and regulatory issues related to their operations. Boards comprised of legal 
experts and active CEOs are shown to improve the environmental performance of industrial 
firms by lowering the overall pollution emitted by plants in populated areas (de Villiers, Naiker, 
& van Staden, 2011). Non-profit organizations concerned with improving social performance 
may benefit from entrepreneurial orientation (EO) provided by the board of directors. EO is 
found to increase market-based funding of the NPO as well as social performance of the 
organization (Coombes, Morris, Allen, & Webb, 2011). 
IORs and Performance  
 Reviewing the literature in entrepreneurship and IORs produces several themes 
about how such IORs lead to performance. Firm performance in international settings is 
frequently examined separately from domestic settings, as firms entering new foreign markets or 
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working with new foreign partners often exhibit a liability of foreignness. Despite this liability, 
research finds numerous ways in which firms can be successful in international settings. First, 
one study suggests that expanding internationally is best done via new ventures (Woodcock, 
Beamish, & Makino, 1994). New ventures are shown to outperform joint ventures for such 
expansion, and both new ventures and joint ventures are shown to outperform acquisitions 
(Woodcock et al., 1994). Other studies suggest that factors beyond the structure of foreign entry 
influence performance. Firms with local joint venture partners that possess experience in the host 
country can increase their profitability, but decreases the survival of the joint venture (Lu & 
Beamish, 2006). As firms gain the local knowledge of their partner, the necessity of the joint 
venture decreases, leading to a higher likelihood of it dissolving (Lu & Beamish, 2006). Zahra 
and Hayton (2008) also find that learning plays a critical role in international contexts, 
demonstrating that absorptive capacity positively influences the relationship between 
international alliances and firm performance. International opportunities are also present for 
firms in transition economies (Malo & Norris, 2009). By forming international alliances to 
manufacture low-cost products, transition economy firms experience performance in sales 
growth (Malo & Norris, 2009).  
While some early research on IORs in entrepreneurial settings found no relationship 
between IORs and performance (e.g., Golden & Dollinger, 1993), the majority of studies find a 
positive relationship (e.g., Certo et al., 2001). Baum et al. (2000) find that marketing alliances 
lead to revenue growth, and alliances with organizations such as universities or research 
institutes improve patenting and R&D performance (Baum et al., 2000). Other studies also find a 
positive relationship between alliance networks and performance. Koka and Prescott (2008) 
examine the nature of alliance networks, finding that entrepreneurial networks outperform 
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prominent networks in terms of sales per employee even during times of incremental change. A 
positive relationship also holds in transition economies, where cooperation and self-commitment 
lead to performance (Fink & Harris, 2012). Alliance entrepreneurship, defined as pro-actively 
seeking and evaluating alliance opportunities, leads to market share, sales growth, market 
development, and product development. (Sarkar, Echambadi, & Harrison, 2001). Small firms in 
uncertain environments experience even greater performance when engaging in alliance 
entrepreneurship (Sarkar et al., 2001). These pro-active, thought-out processes to creating 
alliance networks are demonstrated in the qualitative study by Ozcan and Eisenhardt (2009). 
Firms in the emerging wireless gaming industry performed best when they created alliance 
networks throughout the industry, strategically creating numerous partners and to avoid 
dependence on any one alliance (Ozcan & Eisenhardt, 2009).  
 Fit and performance. Studies also examine the relationship between firm resources and 
those of their alliance partners. D’Souza and McDougall (1989) find that fit between firm 
advantages present at multiple levels and the needs of their joint venture partners in developing 
countries leads to higher performance. This relationship is also found in the fit between 
management experience and the type of alliance formed by a firm (McGee, Dowling, & 
Megginson, 1995). For example, marketing alliances produce higher performance when firm 
management possesses marketing experience (McGee et al., 1995). Finally, in a related concept, 
Harrison et al. (2001) find that complementary resources between firms are critical to the success 
of alliances and acquisitions.  
Network position and performance. Network position is also shown to lead to 
performance. Network centrality is shown to lead to new product development performance 
(Soh, 2003) and also to moderate the relationship between EO and firm performance (Stam & 
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Elfring, 2008). Vissa and Chacar (2009) also find positive outcomes stemming from a firm’s 
network position, as structural holes are shown to lead to increases in revenue. Firms also 
experience higher performance when they conduct network brokerage as part of participation in 
industry events (Stam, 2010). Firms filling structural holes in their networks are also often able 
to leverage their position for positive performance. Lechner and Leyronas (2012) find that 
structural holes are important for clustered firms and lead to higher revenue.  
 Learning and performance. Learning and knowledge are also key factors in 
performance related to alliances. Knowledge spillovers taking place during alliances have a 
positive relationship with alliance performance and firm performance (Honig et al., 2006; Shu, 
Liu, Gao, & Shanley, 2014). Knowledge acquisition resulting from cross-border outsourcing 
leads to firm performance (Li et al., 2010).  Learning capabilities mediate the relationship 
between resource acquisition types and performance (Cai et al., 2014).  Managers must be 
willing to accept that some of their current knowledge may be wrong to learn from JV partners 
(Inkpen & Crossan, 1995). 
Innovation and product performance.  Innovation is a sought-after goal of many 
entrepreneurial firms (e.g., Sampson, 2007), and alliances can help firms seeking innovation. 
Larson (1991) finds that entrepreneurial firms can improve innovation performance when 
partnering together and sharing information. However, this result is not consistently found. 
Jones, Lanctot, and Teegan (2001) find that external technology acquisition has a negative 
relationship with product and financial performance. Li and Atuahene-Gima (2001) also find 
negative financial performance to be the outcome when firms enter alliance for innovation and 
product development. 
45 
 
Overall, the relationship between IORs and performance suggests that firms benefit from 
engaging in relationships with other firms. However, as described above, some mixed results 
exist. One explanation for mixed results suggests that autonomy is a key construct in IORs, but is 
often ignored (Drees & Huegens, 2013). The next section discusses autonomy, the mechanisms 
that provide autonomy, and the relationship between autonomy and performance.  
AUTONOMY  
Autonomy is an organization’s freedom to make decisions regarding its internal resources 
without external influence (Oliver, 1991a). A lack of autonomy causes firms to dedicate 
resources to meet demands brought on by external organizations, and firms are ultimately 
seeking autonomy through resource dependence remedies (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Oliver 
(1991a) describes autonomy as having three distinct mechanisms. First, autonomy allows a firm 
to meet the demands of multiple external actors simultaneously, preventing resources from being 
constrained. Second, autonomy is the ability of a firm to respond to contingencies, insulating 
them from unforeseen events that may constrain the flow of resources (Oliver, 1991a). Third, 
organizational relationships may create the possibility for opportunistic behavior on the part of a 
resource provider that leads to benefits for the resource provider and negative outcomes for the 
focal firm (Oliver, 1991a). The next paragraphs review the studies that consider autonomy 
according to each of these mechanisms. A summary of how autonomy is treated by articles in 
this literature review is contained in Table 2.1. 
Mechanisms of Autonomy 
Meeting multiple demands simultaneously. Firms seeking autonomy in this way are 
attempting to secure other options for access to resources. Lechner and Leyronas (2012) discuss 
autonomy in terms of structural holes in the firm’s network. Like Oliver’s (1991a) description of 
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autonomy, structural holes are proposed to grant preferential access to resources, bargaining 
power, and the ability to change. Structural holes, and thus autonomy, are shown to lead to firm 
performance (Lechner & Leyronas, 2012). 
Ozcan and Eisenhardt (2009) do not discuss autonomy explicitly but describe a similar 
relationship by explaining how firms create alliance networks to reduce dependence that can 
exist in dyadic alliances. The performance of individual ties in the portfolio is then stronger as 
firms organize around key industry structure, locate centrally, and make ties around uncertainty.  
Responding to contingencies. Patzelt et al. (2008) describe firms being dependent on 
alliances, suggesting that these firms lack autonomy. This situation arises due a lack of 
organizational slack for alliance formation, causing firms to continue to remain committed to 
underperforming alliances. While other research examines firms in situations that may allow for 
investigation regarding this type of autonomy, no other studies in this review proposed such a 
relationship in theory or tested one empirically. 
Avoiding opportunistic behavior. Some studies approach autonomy from a very 
simplistic viewpoint. Gales and Blackburn (1990) consider the perceived autonomy of retailers 
dealing with suppliers. While suppliers may have control over critical resources, frequent 
communication between suppliers and retailers leads to retailers perceiving autonomy (Gales & 
Blackburn, 1990). Kanter, Richardson, North, & Morgan (1991) touch upon autonomy in their 
study of Eastman Kodak. Proposed projects arising from within the firm were required to 
function autonomously, without the need for the manufacturing or other resources currently 
controlled by Eastman Kodak (Kanter et al., 1991). In a very simplistic view, Fink and Harris 
(2012) consider firms to have autonomy is they are legally independent organizations.  
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 Multiple studies consider autonomy in terms of the interdependence present between 
firms. Lichenstein and Brush (2001) propose that interdependence arises from resource salience. 
As their findings show that the salience of resources changes over time in entrepreneurial firms, 
interdependence can also shift from one resource provider to answer. Koka and Prescott (2008) 
view interdependence as beneficial to firms in cooperative alliances, as it leads to higher quality 
exchange. Developing from a high level of resource commitment, interdependence enables 
effective transactions between partners and fosters the flow of information (Koka & Prescott, 
2008). In a contrary approach, Benghozi and Salvador (2014) assume that autonomy is lost 
during traditional partnerships between firms.  
Autonomy and Performance 
Meta-analysis finds that resource dependence remedies are likely to increase firm 
performance through the mediating mechanism of autonomy (Drees & Huegens, 2013). This 
section discusses articles found in the literature review search results that investigate that 
relationship. A summary of the results of each study, whether or not autonomy is considered, is 
found in the last column of Table 2.1. 
Gales and Blackburn (1990) examine the relationship between autonomy and various 
operational performance outcomes. While the authors initially argued that frequent and intense 
communication between retailers and supplier would lead to less autonomy, results show that 
such communication may reduce uncertainty in the relationship and preserve retailers’ ability to 
act. Autonomy then leads to increases in planning, advertising, promotional activity, and 
decreases in uncertainty (Gales & Blackburn, 1990).   
Lechner and Leyronas (2012) examine the autonomy of a firm in a network. Like Gales 
and Blackburn (1990), Lechner and Leyronas (2012) argue that autonomy is related to accessing 
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valuable information. Additionally, autonomy provides preferential access to resources that then 
lead to firm performance (Lechner & Leyronas, 2012). Fink and Harris (2012) also find that 
autonomy is one aspect of alliance commitment that leads to an index of firm performance 
measures, including employee performance, sales performance, and customer satisfaction. It 
should be noted, though, that autonomy was only one of 17 items in the questionnaire measuring 
alliance commitment (Fink & Harris, 2012).  
A small number of studies examine the relationship between autonomy and performance, 
demonstrating its importance to the literature on resource dependence remedies. However, 
autonomy is found to mediate the relationship between resource dependence remedies and firm 
performance (Drees & Heugens, 2013), making it a key concept in the literature. The lack of 
substantial research that considers the role of autonomy in IORs that seek to remedy dependence 
is problematic for the understanding of such relationships, as it may potentially explain negative 
or non-findings in the literature, or add further explanatory power to the reasons and conditions 
that lead firms to seek IORs to remedy dependence. 
CONCLUSION 
 Research examining dependence, autonomy, and remedies for dependence in 
entrepreneurial firms is deep in some areas, such as financial remedies mostly relating to venture 
capital and alliances seeking out critical resources. However, it is shown to be lacking in other 
areas, especially regarding the study of autonomy. As resource dependence is shown to be 
especially relevant to entrepreneurial settings (Daily et al., 2002) and firms seeking to remedy 
dependence are ultimately seeking autonomy (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), the lack of studies 
considering autonomy represents a large deficiency in the literature. This is especially true given 
that entrepreneurial firms often lack required resources and must engage in various IORs to 
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access financial and complementary resources needed for the development of the firm (Katila et 
al., 2008). Entering into these relationships creates a situation ripe for the creation of dependence 
by the more powerful firm. Additionally, results of some studies report contradictory 
relationships between remedies and performance, suggesting that further research is needed to 
better predict and describe the phenomenon. Lastly, while some studies consider resources by 
type, others strictly investigate remedies in terms of their structure. Understanding how firms 
acquire specific resources and the outcomes of doing so may also shed light on some 
contradictory findings. The next chapter presents additional relevant literature covering resource 
dependence, autonomy, remedies, and performance. Hypotheses are also developed and 
presented.   
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CHAPTER III: HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Resource Dependence 
 Resource dependence describes a situation in which a firm heavily relies upon another 
firm in its external environment to supply critical inputs (Pfeffer, 1972b; Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Bae & Gargiulo, 2004). These social situations are characterized 
by interdependencies between firms that limit possible actions and threaten firm survival 
(Pfeffer, 1987). Power is a key dynamic underlying these social situations (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978). Stemming from seminal work in power relations by Emerson (1962) and Thompson 
(1967), resource dependence recognizes that firms may have different amounts of power over 
each other and that this power may not cancel out (Emerson, 1962). Indeed, Pfeffer (1981) 
claims that firms should minimize their dependence on other firms and maximize the dependence 
of other firms on them (Pfeffer, 1981). Questions regarding this prescription remain, though, as 
implementing coercive strategies can remove any incentive that the dependent firm may have to 
work for the mutual benefit of both firms (Gulati & Sytch, 2007). Such coercion can lead to 
negative performance for the powerful organization (Gulati & Sytch, 2007), rather than the 
theorized positive outcomes (Pfeffer, 1981).   
Types of Resource Dependence Remedies 
As Wry et al. (2013) describe in their review of the resource dependence literature, 
prolific empirical evidence supports the idea that firms remedy dependence through IORs. 
However, changes in the environment from the 1970s to today suggest that firms consider 
remedies beyond those traditionally studied, leading Davis and Cobb (2010) to suggest that the 
traditional remedies, such as joint ventures and acquisitions, need to be updated. Relatedly, 
studies often examine IORs in terms of the relationship structure (e.g., joint ventures or 
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acquisitions) without considering the specific resource being exchanged in the IOR. These issues 
are further discussed, and hypotheses are developed below. 
Firms frequently seek external resources by engaging IORs with other firms (e.g., Baum 
& Silverman, 2004). Given the often public and easily observed nature of IORs such as joint 
ventures, acquisitions, and board of director interlocks, it is understandable that scholars often 
examine resource dependence by evaluating the outcomes of these IORs. However, research 
suggests that firms seek resources in different manners based upon the type of resource being 
sought (Katila et al., 2008). Following this line of research, resource dependence remedies are 
considered in terms of access to financial resources or complementary resources. Financial 
resources represent access to capital and are fungible in nature. Complementary resources 
represent operational resources that are necessary for the continued development of the firm and 
not typically provided by financial resource providers. For example, venture capital firms 
provide financial resources but are unlikely to provide direct access to manufacturing or 
marketing resources. The next sections present arguments regarding remedies for financial 
resource dependence and complementary resource dependence and develop hypotheses.   
Financial Resource Dependence Remedies and Performance 
Financial dependence represents the need for outside cash to sustain and grow the firm 
(Katila et al., 2008). Few, if any, resources are more crucial to firm survival than access to 
capital. This is reflected in both traditional approaches to resource dependence that focus on 
large firms and board interlocks (e.g., Pfeffer, 1972c), and more modern approaches involving 
entrepreneurial firms and alternatives sources of financing (e.g., Gabrielsson, 2007). The 
fungible nature of financial resources delineates financial resource dependence as a unique type 
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of resource dependence. This dissertation follows Katila et al. (2008) and defines financial 
resource dependence as a lack of financial resources necessary to sustain and grow the firm.  
Empirical support for firms requiring financial resources is abundant.  Pfeffer (1972c) 
shows that firms with higher needs for financial resources are more likely to create linkages with 
financial institutions through board of director interlocks to acquire financing. Similarly, Lang 
and Lockhart (1990) find that firms whose financial dependence increases respond by increasing 
the number of board of director interlocks with financial institutions. These interlocks are widely 
used to acquire financial resources, as results show that the simple presence of financial 
representation on a board makes a firm more likely to borrow than firms without financial 
representation (Mizruchi & Steans, 1994).  
However, the traditional focus on director interlocks as a remedy for financial resource 
dependence is challenged by observations that anti-trust and banking regulations on modern 
firms may prevent such IORs from forming (Drees & Heugens, 2013). Indeed, Davis (1996) 
notices a steep decline in bank interlocks in U.S. firms after regulatory changes. These 
environmental changes suggest that some traditional resource dependence remedies are in need 
of updates (Davis & Cobb, 2010). Venture capital is described by Rosenbusch, Brinckmann, and 
Muller (2013) as a formal investment (Bruton, Chahine, & Filatotchev, 2009) by professional 
investors (Gompers & Lerner 2001) who take an active role in the firm (Sahlman, 1990) and 
seek high returns (Dimov, Shepherd, & Sutcliffe, 2007). Firms exchange equity and board of 
director seats for cash that can be used to further the goals of the firm (Rosenstein, 1988). The 
use of venture capital in addition to and in place of traditional financing has played a role in this 
change, as the amount of venture capital available increased substantially over a recent 25-year 
period (Puri & Zarutskie, 2012). Indeed, firms often elect the use of venture capital even when 
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capital markets may provide the necessary funding (Hoehn-Weiss & Barden, 2014). Younger, 
smaller firms are especially likely to seek financing from venture capital firms or similar 
alternatives, as financing through formal financial institutions is typically not available (Aldrich 
& Auster, 1996). While the mechanism for acquiring financial resources may differ for young 
firms compared to the director interlock-assisted borrowing often utilized by established firms, 
dependence on such resources remains (Hillman et al., 2009).  
Research examining remedies for financial resource dependence has not failed to notice 
the use of venture capital, as numerous empirical studies investigate phenomena associated with 
venture capital financing. Venture capitalists are shown to target industries with high growth 
(Zacharakis, McMullen, & Shepherd, 2007), and specific firms demonstrating high potential, 
such as a skilled and experienced founding team (Baum & Silverman, 2004). Additionally, as 
venture capital provides an infusion of cash to a firm that is by definition in need of such 
resources, firms have the opportunity to improve performance by utilizing this cash for 
development of the firm. Firms may hire additional employees, acquire assets, launch a product, 
or continue potentially valuable R&D after accessing financial resources (Baum & Silverman, 
2004). As any remedy for dependence is a means to an end, research frequently examines the 
relationship between acquiring venture capital and firm performance. This relationship is shown 
to exist in several studies. 
Financial resources in the form of venture capital may be acquired in a different manner 
than traditional financing, but boards of directors still play a role, as entrepreneurial firms are 
often required to appoint outside board members from the venture capital firm as part of any 
funding round (Rosenstein, 1988). These directors may also bring benefits to the firm. Daily and 
Dalton (1993) study the composition of boards of directors and the effects of outside board 
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members. Outside directors are more likely to work in the best interests of the firm and avoid 
decisions that may hamper performance, such as golden parachutes or policies that entrench 
management. Results show that outside directors lead to higher sales revenue and growth (Daily 
& Dalton, 1993). Fried et al. (1998) also suggest that active boards in venture capital backed 
firms experience higher performance.   
Additional empirical findings also support a positive relationship between acquiring 
venture capital and growth (Carlsson, 2002).  Indeed, a primary reason firms seek financial 
resources is to provide the flexibility needed for growth (Columbo & Grilli, 2010). Venture 
capitalists providing financing also typically have screening and monitoring capabilities that 
allow for the selection of firms that are more likely to grow (Columbo & Grilli, 2010). Venture 
capitalists may also provide strong contractual incentives for firms to work toward growth 
(Gompers, 1995; Kaplan & Stromberg, 2004). Overall, research suggests that venture capital 
leads to increases in growth as venture capitalists select promising firms (e.g., Columbo & Grilli, 
2010) and also add value to the firm through their expertise (e.g., Dimov & Shepherd, 2005). 
Venture capitalists may also create value through the services provided to funded firms 
(Wijbenga et al., 2007). By providing assistance when entrepreneurial firms face challenges, 
such as cost overruns or lower sales, venture capitalists are likely to improve the financial 
performance of the firm (Wijbenga et al., 2007).   
Despite the advantage associated with venture capital, some studies fail to find a 
relationship between venture capital and firm performance (Busenitz et al., 2004; Jain, 
Jayaramen, & Kini, 2008). These divergent results may be the result of evaluating performance 
outcomes that are not sought after in the realm of venture capital. As previously stated, venture 
capitalist focus on high growth industries (Zacharakis et al., 2007) and many studies find results 
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supporting a relationship between venture capital and growth, as previously discussed. Growth is 
also found more often than other performance outcomes such as profitability (Rosenbusch et al., 
2013). 
 Thus, firms seeking venture capital as a financial dependence remedy will have success 
when focusing on sales growth. 
 
H1: Financial resource dependence remedies in the form of venture capital funding will 
have a positive relationship with sales growth. 
 
Complementary Resource Dependence Remedies 
The successful commercialization of products or services by a firm typically requires 
complementary resources, consisting of non-financial resources beyond those directly needed for 
the product or service itself (Teece, 1986). These resources may require various levels of 
investment and commitment depending on the particular resource being sought, as well as by 
industry or firm (Katila et al., 2008). For example, a start-up firm that has successfully designed 
and patented a new medical device will require the resources needed to produce the device as 
well as a sales force tasked with selling the product to doctors, hospitals, and other medical 
providers. Conversely, a firm producing a new bottled energy drink will require distribution and 
mass marketing resources. The precise list of possible complementary resources a firm will seek 
is vast, but resources may be classified according to the level of commitment required for their 
acquisition. Following Katila et al. (2008), who find that manufacturing and marketing resources 
differ in how they are obtained due to their scarcity and the commitment required by a firm to 
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obtain them, this dissertation classifies complementary resources as either high commitment or 
low commitment. Hypotheses for each are now developed.  
High commitment complementary resource dependence remedies. Complementary 
resources requiring high levels of commitment are characterized by higher levels of scarcity 
relative to other resources and are typically more difficult to access. For example, Katila et al. 
(2008) describe manufacturing resources as having large capital requirements, scarce 
availability, and high commitment levels. The level of commitment is especially high for young 
firms (Katila et al., 2008). Similarly, Das et al. (1998) also state that acquiring access to 
manufacturing resources may be characterized by high fixed costs and also lack alternatives, 
creating high levels of commitment. High commitment levels from young firms can create 
dependent situations as firms may be locked in and unable to secure manufacturing from an 
alternative provider in the short-term. Indeed, manufacturers seeking to reduce their uncertainty 
related to the success of products may seek long-term contracts from firms seeking their services 
(Gerwin, 1993).  
Despite the costs associated with accessing high commitment resources such as 
manufacturing, firms continue to engage in IORs to access manufacturing due to the possible 
benefits. For example, firms experienced in R&D tend to realize increased firm performance 
when entering into alliances to secure R&D resources (McGee et al., 1995). Additionally, the 
high fixed costs associated with alliances may be reduced due to economies of scale and scope, 
transaction costs may be reduced, and smaller partners in manufacturing alliances are found to 
receive greater benefits than the larger partner (Das et al., 1998). Alliances that are strategically 
important and provide access to complementary resources are also found to lead to firm growth 
(Lunnan & Haugland, 2008). As such alliances provide access to previously unavailable 
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resources that can be immediately utilized, performance quickly results (Lunnan & Haugland, 
2008).  Manufacturing alliances, in particular, are likely to be strategic for young or start-up 
firms, as they allow for greater control of the manufacturing process (Park et al., 2002). Finally, 
non-corporate ventures seeking manufacturing resources are also likely to experience higher 
growth when acquiring the resources via an alliance, as opposed to vertical integration (Zahra & 
George, 1999). Thus:  
 
H2: Firms that enter into IORs that grant access to high commitment complementary 
resources will have a positive relationship with sales growth. 
 
Low commitment complementary resource dependence remedies. Katila et al. (2008) 
describe the nature of marketing resources as one specific low commitment complementary 
resource. Marketing resources are typically available in greater numbers or amounts than high 
commitment resources such as manufacturing (Das et al, 1998) and are thus unlikely to require 
large capital investments up-front or high levels of commitment.  Such low commitment 
resources are thus available without entering into a high commitment IOR (Katila et al., 2008).  
  One low commitment resource, marketing resources, is shown to create value for firms 
in alliances in three ways (Swaminathan & Moorman, 2009). First, firms may be able to access 
new markets provided by an alliance partner (Koka & Prescott, 2008), creating the possibility for 
additional growth. Second, firms may be able to utilize brands or products that were previously 
unavailable, granting the opportunity to widen markets in which the firm is already active 
(Kalaignanam, Shankar, & Varadarajan 2007). Finally, firms may be accessing resources that 
they previously lacked (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). For example, technology firms that have 
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focused purely on product development may have no internal resources available for marketing 
that product. Accessing such resources may lead to lower costs and increase cash flow compared 
to developing such resources internally (Swaminathan & Moorman, 2009). Chatterjee (2004) 
explains that accessing such resources is especially relevant to entrepreneurial firms, who 
otherwise may not be able to access new markets or reach economies of scale.  
However, empirical results supporting a link between low commitment resource 
dependence remedies and performance are not universal. Das et al. (1998) find no relationship 
between marketing alliances and performance measured as the cumulative abnormal stock 
returns in the period following a marketing alliance announcement. However, stock market 
reactions and other studies that evaluate the perceived benefits of alliances (e.g., Kale et al., 
2002) fail to capture the actual business-level outcomes that result from alliances and the 
utilization of resources (Das et al., 1998).Overall, low commitment resources are likely to 
facilitate the development of the firm in a manner that allows for the full commercialization of a 
product or service (Teece, 1986), which is likely to lead to the growth of the firm (Das et al., 
1998). Thus: 
 
H3: Firms that enter into IORs that grant access to low commitment complementary 
resources will have a positive relationship with sales growth. 
 
Autonomy as Mediation 
Research in resource dependence does not exclusively examine organizational outcomes 
through a profit-seeking lens (Oliver, 1991b), although many studies have taken such an 
approach (e.g. Pfeffer, 1972b; Villalonga & McGahan, 2005; Weitz & Shenhav, 2000). By 
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assuming a profit-seeking motive by organizations, RDT aligns itself with strategic management 
in attempting to explain differences in performance outcomes (Oliver, 1991b). Autonomy is thus 
a critical construct in resource dependence research, as it is shown to mediate the relationship 
between dependence remedies and performance (Drees & Heugens, 2013).  
Firms seeking remedies for dependence are ultimately seeking autonomy (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). Autonomy is an organization’s freedom to make decisions regarding its internal 
resources without external influence (Oliver, 1991a). A lack of autonomy causes organizations to 
dedicate resources to meet demands brought on by external organizations (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978). Thus, firms seek out autonomy through environmental management. Oliver’s (1991a) 
broad definition of autonomy coincides with the treatment autonomy has received in the 
literature. However, various treatments of autonomy in the literature suggest that it also appears 
likely to possess different characteristics depending on the resource sought by the firm. Oliver 
(1991a) describes autonomy as having three mechanisms that could lead to a positive 
relationship with firm performance. Each of these mechanisms is discussed below, and 
hypotheses relating to each are developed. 
Responding to Contingencies 
 One mechanism underlying autonomy is the ability for a firm to respond to 
contingencies, insulating it from unforeseen events that may constrain the flow of resources 
(Oliver, 1991a). Successfully responding to contingencies allows an organization to maintain 
relationships that become strained due to changes in the environment. For example, Beekun and 
Ginn (1993) find that hospitals adjust their linkages with other organizations in order to maintain 
resources that matched their strategy, based on environmental uncertainty. The changing 
demands of a key stakeholder may also produce contingencies. Ingram and Simons (1995) find 
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that firms respond to the demand for work-family considerations when other organizations also 
responded, or when female managers at the firm demand change. 
 Contingencies can also take a simpler form. Firms that sell products or services on credit 
to buyers must deal with the uncertainty that arises from collecting payments that are owed. The 
constant management of cash flow creates an ongoing contingency, whereby a firm must make 
decisions based on its customers’ ability and willingness to pay. Possessing the flexibility to 
adjust terms of payment is then critical in such contingent situations (Peng & Luo, 2000). In a 
similar financial context, research shows that having cash on hand can reduce dependence on 
creditors who may or may not feel an obligation to firms seeking credit (Uzzi, 1999). 
Firms can never truly prepare for all contingencies. However, possessing discretionary 
financial resources creates a great deal of flexibility (George, 2005). One treatment of autonomy 
is in the form of cash on hand or other financial flexibility that allows a firm to operate in the 
manner it desires. Peng and Luo (2000) find that firms with favorable terms of payment 
experience higher performance. The ability to collect accounts receivable, along with favorable 
terms for accounts payable maximizes the amount of cash in the firms at all time, granting 
greater flexibility. Peng and Luo (2000) find that such payment terms produce gains in market 
share. Uzzi (1999) also suggests that a similar measure of autonomy produces benefits for the 
firm. Firms with cash on hand sufficient to fund the operations of the firm in the short-term 
experienced less dependence on creditors in the form of a lower cost of capital. As higher costs 
of capital are expenses with no attached benefit, such expenses are likely to limit the firm’s 
autonomy and reduce any expected growth (Peng & Luo, 2000).   
In sum, financial autonomy stemming from discretionary resources provides flexibility 
(Peng & Luo, 2000; George, 2005) that may grant multiple benefits. Financial autonomy assists 
61 
 
firms working to meet the changing demands of the environment, (Beekun & Ginn, 1993; 
Ingram & Simons, 1995), and reduces dependence on others (Uzzi, 1999). These benefits then 
lead to the growth of the firm (Rosenbusch et al., 2013; Peng & Luo, 2000; Columbo & Grilli, 
2010). Thus:  
 
H4: Financial autonomy in the form of discretionary cash resources will mediate the 
relationship between financial dependence remedies and sales growth. 
 
Avoiding Opportunistic Behavior 
 The second mechanism of autonomy allows a firm to avoid opportunistic behavior on the 
part of other parties (Oliver, 1991a). Opportunistic behavior may take place within an IOR by a 
resource provider, leading benefits for the resource provider and negative outcomes for the focal 
firm (Oliver, 1991a). However, some evidence also suggests that firms using their power to 
control other firms in such IORs experience lower firm performance (Gulati & Sytch, 2007). In 
this case controlling tactics may cause the less powerful firm to operate less efficiently and make 
less of an effort. Instead of working together to produce a larger pie, the more powerful firm 
simply gains a larger share of a smaller pie (Gulati & Sytch, 2007).  
 Firms seeking resources that require a great deal of commitment may be more likely to 
encounter opportunistic behavior from an IOR partner. For example, manufacturing resources 
are capital intensive, scarcely available, and may require equity transfers or other substantial 
commitments (Katila et al., 2008). Such commitments may then prevent firms from seeking 
alternative resources, causing autonomy to depend on the interactions taking place within the 
IOR. Additionally, the relatively scarce nature of such resources may prevent firms from having 
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alternative choices when choosing a resource provider. Firms being abused by such powerful 
trading partners may seek to maneuver around those partners to reduce dependence (Ketchen & 
Hult, 2007), but such maneuvers may be unavailable given the lack of alternatives and the high 
levels of commitment required to secure the resource. Indeed, Gerwin (1993) finds that 
manufacturing firms tend to seek long-term commitments from those seeking their services in 
order to reduce the risk related to the failure of the manufactured product. Firms offering 
valuable high commitment resources may also seek to avoid their IOR partners having other 
partners that provide the same resource, as opportunistic behavior may be more likely (Nohria & 
Garcia-Pont, 1991). For example, a pharmaceutical firm may avoid entering into an R&D 
alliance with a firm that is already engaged in a similar alliance with their direct competitor.   
Firms are also unlikely to terminate alliances that are considered strategically important 
(Lunnan & Haugland, 2008). In addition to the formal commitment made by partners in a high 
commitment alliance, large investments are unlikely to be abandoned quickly as firms make 
escalations of commitment (Sleesman et al., 2012). For example, a firm launching a new product 
is likely to begin by outsourcing some tasks, but then later enter into an alliance to secure 
manufacturing (Marion et al., 2015). Overall, firms are likely to secure high commitment 
resources from only one alliance partner and to be committed to that partner for some time. 
High commitment resource dependence may continue throughout the life of an IOR as 
well. Wasti and Liker (1999) explain how constraints in the manufacturing services available to a 
firm effect the overall design of a product, suggesting that dependence on manufacturing 
resources may also be present during and after product development. While firms may prefer 
certain specifications for products, such preferences may not be commercially or technologically 
realistic. Such issues may come to light after manufacturing alliances have been formed, leading 
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to a suboptimal situation with few or no available alternatives (Wasti & Liker, 1999). Firms 
attempting to maintain control over innovations may also be concerned when securing 
manufacturing resources for products. Manufacturing is likely to be secured through a larger firm 
with excess capacity (Pisano, 1990), and in such circumstances, a manufacturer’s interests may 
not align with the interests of its customer. Rather than simply providing manufacturing, the 
opportunity to misappropriate any valuable product design or innovation is a possibility (Santos 
& Eisenhardt, 2005; Hallen et al., 2014). This possible opportunistic behavior only creates 
additional dependence on the choice and acquisition of manufacturing resources by smaller 
firms. 
Firms with autonomy can avoid opportunistic behavior from IOR partners that grant 
access to high commitment resources (Oliver, 1991a). One manner in which firms may do so is 
to avoid entering into relationships that allow firms to engage in such behavior with little to no 
consequences for doing so. Firms may succeed in this endeavor if they can enter into IORs to 
secure resources with as little commitment as possible, as a lower commitment level suggests 
that firms possess other options to secure the resource. Nohria and Garcia-Pont (1991) explain 
that IORs such as distribution agreements or those that do not require equity to be transferred 
represent lower levels of commitment than IORs such as independent joint ventures or 
acquisitions. Additionally, accessing strategic resources via IORs is typically less costly than 
internal development and creates an easier path to reverse course if necessary (Porter & Fuller, 
1986). Within IORs, commitment level is higher when equity transfers are involved (Nohria & 
Garica-Pont, 1991), which also works to prevent change once decisions are made to enter into 
such an IOR.  
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Firms prefer lower commitment IORs to higher commitment IORs, as IOR partners are 
more likely to offer cooperation and assistance that allows the resource provided to be beneficial 
(Nohria & Garcia-Pont, 1991). Similar relationships are found in the literature describing mutual 
dependence and complementary resources. Mutually dependent firms are more likely to work 
together toward common goals and is empirically shown to increase alliance performance (Xia, 
2011; Xia & Li, 2013). Mutual dependence may also lead to the growth of the firm as it 
emphasizes joint action and trust, which may drive the growth of the firm (Grewel, Iyer, Javalgi, 
& Radulovich, 2011). Thus: 
 
H5a: Complementary resource autonomy will mediate the relationship between high 
commitment complementary resource dependence remedies and sales growth, such that 
lower commitment levels will positively mediate the relationship between IORs and sales 
growth. 
 
Meeting Multiple Demands  
Oliver (1991a) also describes autonomy as allowing a firm to meet the demands of 
multiple external actors simultaneously, preventing resources from being constrained. Hambrick, 
Finkelstein, Cho, and Jackson (2005) further theorize about dealing with multiple external actors 
simultaneously. An increase in legitimate business models combined with less government 
influence and more diverse managerial backgrounds helps create increased heterogeneity among 
firms in an industry. Working together, these factors suggest that organizations have a wide 
variety of dependence reduction remedies at their disposal, but also likely means that 
organizations must be able to meet the differing demands created by a more heterogeneous 
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external environment. The ability to meet multiple or differing demands simultaneously suggests 
that an organization can successfully deal with multiple external actors at once, either by meeting 
their demands, or choosing alternative options that produce more favorable outcomes for the 
focal organization. Hambrick et al. (2005) also posit that environmental conditions are now more 
favorable for firms seeking autonomy. Through a combination of reduced government oversight, 
an increase in the diversity of the task-backgrounds of managers, and a rise in the number of 
viable business models, firms possess a multitude of options for acquiring necessary resources 
and reducing dependence. Forming relationships with new partners indeed provides additional 
access to resources and thus possible solutions to problems. Firms facing environmental 
uncertainty are more likely to undertake such action (Beckman et al., 2004).  
 Ahoni, Maimon, and Segev (1981) examine the effects of multiple competing demands. 
Managers often face heterogeneous pressures, but some pressures are complementary. That is, by 
satisfying one set of pressures managers can simultaneously reduce another set, suggesting that 
multiple demands can be met simultaneously. David, Bloom, and Hillman (2007) also find 
evidence to support this mechanism of autonomy. Firms seeking to satisfy activist investors and 
shareholders are often able to appease both parties or overcome demands when in a position to 
do so. Firms are found to either challenge investor petitions in court, ignore them and allow a 
shareholder vote, or compromise with the activist in order to pacify the demand and 
simultaneously continue to pursue the firm’s intended goals (David et al., 2007). Empirical 
support also exists showing that firms can utilize or create additional options to secure external 
resources. In their seminal study of the United Way, Provan, Beyer, and Kruytbosch (1980) show 
how ties with third parties can affect the dyadic relationship between two organizations. 
Resources are obtained not just through power and influence over one party, but through a 
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network of relationships between organizations. Similarly, Gargiulo (1993) demonstrates that 
autonomy can be created by creating a relationship with a third party in order to assert influence 
over or alleviate pressure from another party. Seeking these new relationships can reduce 
uncertainty by granting access to a wider range of resource providers (Beckman, Haunschild, & 
Phillips, 2004), likely increasing autonomy.  
New firms are also shown to benefit from access to a large and heterogeneous group of 
resource providers, resulting in reduced dependence on any given partner. Firms may gain access 
to novel solutions, overcome a lack of knowledge, and identify the best partners available as the 
business continues to develop (Sullivan & Ford, 2014). New firms with multiple alliances are 
shown to see an increase in sales growth, and a diverse set of alliances leads to both sales growth 
and increases in market share (Pangarka & Wu, 2013).  
Overall, firms seeking low commitment complementary resources are likely to gain 
autonomy when access to multiple resource providers is present. In such instances, a lower 
commitment level should be required to access such resources, as low commitment resources are 
more readily available. Successfully doing so will then lead to an increase in firm performance 
(Drees & Heugens, 2013).  
 
H5b: Complementary resource autonomy will mediate the relationship between low 
commitment complementary resource dependence remedies and sales growth, such that 
lower commitment levels will positively mediate the relationship between IORs and sales 
growth. 
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Preventing New Dependencies  
Pfeffer (1987) notes that attempts to remedy resource dependence are not likely to be 
completely successful and that any action taken is likely to produce a new and different set of 
dependencies than previously existed. This is further supported by the narrative review work of 
Hillman et al. (2009), who find that attempts to restore autonomy are not often fully successful, 
and often cause new sets of dependencies to emerge. This assumption fits within the logic of 
resource dependence theory. A focal firm seeking resources from another firm is unlikely to gain 
access to those resources without giving up something of value in exchange. The exchange 
partner is also influenced by its external environment and acts with self-interest (Pfeffer, 1972b), 
making it unlikely to give up its own autonomy without benefit. Pfeffer (1981) also assumes that 
organizations work to secure resources that cause other organizations to become dependent on 
them. However, some evidence suggests that using such power may result in poor performance 
for the firm as less powerful firms have no incentive to improve performance when benefits will 
simply accrue to more powerful firms (Gulati & Sytch, 2007).  
In contrast, IORs involving a degree of cooperation, or that provide complementary 
benefits in addition to the resources being exchanged may create a set of conditions that lead to 
mutual benefit for both organizations. Madhok and Tallman (1998) find that alliance value is 
embedded within inter- and intrafirm relationships, which drive the collection of rents and 
provide an incentive to maintain the relationship. The formation of such relationships may also 
prevent the creation of new dependencies as firms instead work toward mutual goals and 
benefits.  
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Boards of Directors and Financial Autonomy 
Daily and Schwenk (1996) explain that resource dependence requirements influence the 
composition of the board of directors, as firms use outside directors to establish relationships 
with other organizations in the external environment. One such relationship that may induce the 
cooperation needed to achieve mutual goals exists within the board of directors of venture 
capital-backed firms. In such instances venture capital firms appoint members to the board of 
directors as part of a funding agreement (Kaplan & Stromberg, 2004), and those members are 
likely to provide advice, counsel, and information (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003) with the intent of 
achieving firm growth (Zacharakis et al., 2007).   This suggests that the board capital of venture 
capital-appointed directors, represented as the sum of human and social capital (Hillman & 
Dalziel, 2003) may help prevent new dependencies from forming. From a resource dependence 
perspective, board capital is proposed to lead to resource provision. Board members’ human 
capital is proposed to provide advice and counsel regarding the strategy and direction of the firm, 
while social capital provides access to various types of information.  
The human and social capital of board members that makes up board capital are studied 
throughout the literature. Hillman et al. (2009) suggest that the types of human and social capital 
present within the board of directors should be parsed to understand precisely what types are 
needed to provide the benefits listed by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978). Indeed, different types of 
human capital provide access to different types of resource provision. Hillman, Cannella, and 
Paetzold (2000) propose a taxonomy of directors using a resource dependence lens, categorizing 
them according to the resources provided by their expertise. Business experts possess expertise 
on competition, assist in decision making, and offer alternative viewpoints on problems facing 
the firm. They are likely to be current and former executives or directors at other large firms. 
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Support specialists provide specialized expertise in areas such as law and banking. They could 
also provide access to critical resources (e.g., financial, legal), and bring social capital that 
provided communication with powerful external organizations or the government. Support 
specialists are likely to be lawyers, bankers, or PR experts.  Finally, influential community 
members provide perspectives on and represent interests outside of the profit-seeking goals of 
the organization. They can influence powerful groups in the community, and may be political 
leaders, university faculty, or leaders of community organizations. (Hillman et al., 2000). 
Overall, directors may bring different types of expertise to the firm that provide benefits in 
specific ways, and the overall relationship between resource provision and performance has 
empirical support throughout the literature as well. 
Within the context of entrepreneurship, Unger et al. (2011) also demonstrate that 
different types of human capital lead to performance. Human capital outcomes, such as 
knowledge and skills, are more beneficial than human capital investments such as education. 
Human capital related to entrepreneurial tasks also has a stronger relationship with performance 
than human capital related to non-entrepreneurial tasks. While this study focuses on the human 
capital of the entrepreneur rather than the board of directors (Unger et al., 2011), the 
entrepreneurial context seems likely to match well to the resource provision that directors engage 
in, especially directors of smaller, private firms who may have valuable entrepreneurial 
experience.  
   Empirical evidence demonstrating the relationship between board capital and 
performance exists in several contexts. In one study that examines differences in board capital, 
Lester, Hillman, Zardkoohi, and Cannella (2008) investigate the human and social capital of 
former government officials as it applies to resource provision. Findings suggest that the tenure 
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and position of the official influences the likelihood of being appointed to a board of directors. 
Additionally, utilizing the taxonomy of Hillman et al. (2000), Kroll, Walters, and Le (2007) 
show that post-IPO firms are likely to benefit from certain types of directors. After delineating 
business experts into those that provided advice and counsel and those that provided monitoring, 
results show that business expert directors providing advice and counsel lead to higher market 
returns (Kroll et al., 2007).  
While boards are shown to assist in performance in many circumstances (e.g., Dalton et 
al., 1999; Lynall et al., 2003), small firms are often faced with decisions regarding dependencies 
and ownership control, which may threaten autonomy. Indeed, entrepreneurs are often faced with 
decisions to accept critical financial resources from providers that may usurp their own valuable 
resources (Hallen, Katila, & Rosenberger, 2014; Katila et al., 2008). Additionally, some research 
finds that owners seek to protect their control of the firm. Daily and Dalton (1993) show that 
founder-led firms have smaller boards and fewer independent directors, as founders seek to 
maintain control of their firms. Fiegener et al. (2000) further demonstrate that owner-led firms 
are likely to appoint board members dependent on the owner, insulating the owner’s control of 
the firm, while non-majority owners are more likely to appoint independent directors to help 
with resource provision. However, a founder’s decision to insulate himself or herself can be 
detrimental as smaller, less independent boards are associated with lower firm performance 
(Daily & Dalton, 1993). Indeed, as entrepreneurs are required to provide board seats (Kaplan & 
Stromberg, 2004) in exchange for financial resources, choosing not to do so in order to insulate 
control may prevent firms from experiencing the benefits that accrue from venture capital (e.g., 
Baum & Silverman, 2004). Evidence suggests that some entrepreneurs do work to appoint board 
members that may bring benefits to the firm.  
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Clarysse, Knockaert, and Lockett (2007) examine board composition in start-up firms in 
terms of the human capital present on the board. Differences in external equity holders are found 
to lead to different types of human capital on the board. More specifically, public research 
organizations with equity stakes are more likely to add complementary human capital, while 
venture capitalists with equity stakes and autonomous owners are likely to add substitute human 
capital to the board. However, Kor and Misangyi (2008) also investigate boards of 
entrepreneurial firms and find differing results. Boards are used for access to industry-related 
experience when top management teams are lacking in industry experience, suggesting that 
boards may be used to access complementary human capital. Regardless of type, this research 
suggests that boards are utilized to add human capital to the firm. 
In sum, the composition of a board for entrepreneurial firms presents several dilemmas 
for founders. Entrepreneurs may face threats from some resource providers attempting to procure 
the firm’s valuable business assets (Katila et al., 2008), and owners may appoint dependent 
board members in order to protect the owner’s control of the firm (Fiegener et al., 2000). Despite 
these potential pitfalls, many boards of entrepreneurial firms are not entirely composed of 
insiders. Boards of venture-backed firms typically have one or more members appointed by the 
venture capitalist, as entrepreneurs are required to provide board seats in exchange for financial 
resources (Kaplan & Stromberg, 2004). Board members appointed in this way and possessing 
valuable human and social capital are more likely to bring benefits to the firm (Hillman & 
Dalziel, 2003), rather than constraints. Indeed, human capital in entrepreneurial settings has a 
positive relationship with firm performance (Unger et al., 2011). Overall, resource provision by 
the board of directors is shown to have a positive relationship with firm performance (Westphal, 
1999; Carpenter & Westphal, 2001).  Thus: 
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H6:  Board capital in outside board members will moderate the relationship between 
financial autonomy and sales growth, such that higher levels of board capital will lead to 
greater sales growth.  
 
Complementary Human Capital and Autonomy 
Firms engaged in IORs face the possibility of opportunistic behavior from their 
relationship partner (Teece, 1986), but may also receive positive benefits due to trust and joint 
action or actively working together (Gulati & Sytch, 2007). Firms seeking to avoid the creation 
of new sets of dependencies that may exist after the remedy of one dependency (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978) may do so when IOR partners bring synergistic or complementary attributes to 
the table, creating the best incentive to work together for mutual benefit. Evidence suggests that 
firms do seek this mutual benefit.  
Firms with complementary resources and partner-specific knowledge are shown to enter 
into alliances (Wang & Zajac, 2007), suggesting that firms are seeking synergy or other positive 
outcomes that may prevent new dependencies from forming. That is, the existence of 
complementary resources suggests that each firm possesses a resource that its partner requires 
but does not have, and also receives added benefit from working together and sharing such 
resources. Firms in such relationships are likely to retain autonomy, as each firm benefits from 
freely providing its resource (Das & Teng, 2000), and abstaining from any coercion or use of 
power that creates a disincentive for the partner firm (Gulati & Sytch, 2007).   
While many resources can be complementary, human capital is perhaps the most valuable 
resource a firm possesses, and its inimitable nature suggests that it is difficult to acquire (Coff, 
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1997; 1999; Crook et al., 2011). Accessing complementary human capital resources may thus be 
better accomplished by engaging in alliances as opposed to acquisitions (Wang & Zajac, 2007) 
or intra-industry recruitment (Hatch & Dyer, 2004). While alliance outcomes are largely positive 
when post-alliance actions such as learning by doing or joint action (Gulati & Sytch, 2007) are 
present, firms seeking to avoid the exchange of one dependency for another (Pfeffer, 1987) must 
know prior to alliance formation if synergistic opportunities exist. Thus, the existence of 
complementary human capital provides firms with the knowledge that such opportunities are 
likely to exist. While the mere existence of complementary human capital does not guarantee 
access to or benefits from an IOR, a known lack of complementary human capital does guarantee 
that benefits will not accrue. Firms entering into IORs with complementary human capital are 
then more likely to obtain synergistic benefits from doing so (Harrison et al., 2001), and to 
improve performance (Hatch & Dyer, 2004). Such IORs are likely to be long-lasting due to low 
coordination costs and increased efficiencies (Humphreys, Lei, and Chan 2004), suggesting that 
firms maintain their own decision-making ability and autonomy. Long-lasting alliances built on 
successful IORs are also shown to lead to traditional financial measures of firm performance 
(Adams, Khoja, & Kauffman, 2012). Thus: 
 
H7a (7b): Complementary human capital between the alliance partner and management 
team of the focal firm will moderate the relationship between high (low) commitment 
complementary resource autonomy and sales growth, such that higher levels of 
complementary human capital will lead to greater sales growth. 
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CHAPTER IV: METHODS 
Data and Methods 
Sample 
To test the above hypotheses data will be collected form a sample of private firms that 
publicly announce agreements to secure financial and complementary resources. Data is 
collected from 2008-2017, avoiding the biggest disruptions of the financial crisis while still 
allowing for a longitudinal approach in analysis. In order to appropriately capture the 
entrepreneurial context described earlier in this paper, data will be gathered from firms six years 
old or less (Zahra, Ireland, & Hitt, 2000).  
Data is collected from multiple sources. First, firm-specific data are provided by PrivCo. 
PrivCo is a database of private company financial information containing financial performance 
data, venture capital transactions, and executive and investor profiles. PrivCo sources 
information from regulatory filings, news sources, and industry resources. Data is available on 
over 850,000 private companies and 112,000 private market deals (PrivCo, 2016). A total of 
3,783 firm-years containing at least some of the required data were found. A total of 3,058 firm-
years are found with observations for company revenue, leading to a total of 2,140 observations 
for the dependent variable, sales growth. After other missing data was removed from the 
analysis, a total of 921 firm-years offered complete data for analysis.  
Second, IORs are collected from company websites, PrivCo, and the Factiva database.  
Company names as well as keywords such as alliance, joint venture, acquisition, and partner 
were used in the search. Third, additional information regarding firm executive profiles, board 
member profiles and investor profiles are collected from multiple sources where necessary. 
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These sources include, LinkedIn, Relationship Science, and company websites. LinkedIn is used 
to capture data related to human capital and board capital. Relationship Science (relsci.com) is 
used to identify board members and board interlocks. Relationship Science provides information 
on corporate executives and board members, including work history and personal networks, for 
thousands of public and private firms. The service is designed to identify relationships between 
individuals, making it appropriate for identifying specific firms’ members and their relationships.  
 
Dependent Variable 
Sales growth. Based on previously reviewed literature, financial and complementary 
remedies are most likely to be successful when firms seek growth as an outcome (Rosenbusch et 
al., 2013).  Sales growth will be measured as the percent change in year-over-year sales 
(Columbo & Grilli, 2010) using the following equation: 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺ℎ =  𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 − 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1
 
Independent Variables 
 Firms are shown to engage in IORs when facing resource dependence situations 
(Finkelstein, 1997). As such, a firm-level view of all such remedies best captures the actions of a 
firm seeking to remedy resource dependence. A total count of IORs in each year that seek to 
remedy dependence will be created. IORs will be separately examined according to the nature of 
the dependence a firm is attempting to remedy using the following constructs.  
Financial resource dependence remedy. Financial remedies will be measured by an 
agreement to secure funding between a focal firm and an individual angel investor, venture 
capitalist firm, or private equity firm. Firms are incentivized to seek funding that is appropriate 
for their needs, as seeking too little funding will fail to produce needed benefits, and too much 
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funding can cause the firm to exchange more equity than necessary for such funding (Katila et 
al., 2008). As firms may have more than one financial remedy, the total of all such agreements in 
each year will be counted.  
High and low commitment complementary resource dependence remedies. 
Complementary resource dependence remedies will be measured by an agreement to secure a 
complementary resource (e.g., manufacturing, marketing, R&D). Katila et al. (2008) find that 
firms enter into IORs to remedy complementary dependencies differently based on scarcity. In 
order to capture high and low commitment complementary resource dependence remedies, the 
type of alliance activity will be examined. Following the findings and explanation by Katila et al. 
(2008), agreements considered to grant access to high commitment resources include: exclusive 
licensing agreements, exploration agreements, manufacturing agreements, and R&D agreements. 
Agreements considered to grant access to low commitment include:  non-exclusive licensing 
agreements, marketing agreements, and supply agreements. A count of each type of remedy 
within each year will be taken. Other types of agreements are coded high or low based on their 
similarity to these specifically named types.  
IOR data is collected from company websites. Many firms publicly announce IOR 
activity, including the activity that partners will engage in as well as the structure of the IOR. For 
example, a firm may announce that they have created an independent joint venture to conduct 
R&D. Firm IOR activity is also double-checked using Factiva.  
Mediating Variables 
Financial autonomy. Financial autonomy is measured as the log of total revenue divided 
by venture capital funding. Large amounts of cash provide firms with the best opportunity to 
retain autonomy when facing contingencies (Oliver, 1991a; Peng& Luo, 2000). Entrepreneurial 
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firms typically have two options for access to cash. They can produce their own via revenue, or 
they can secure venture capital funding. Firms earning enough revenue to operate and grow are 
unlikely to seek venture capital, as doing so requires a costly grant of equity (Rosenstein, 1988) 
as well as influence that is attached to the equity. However, outside funding is often required to 
grow the firm. Entrepreneurs are thus incentivized to accept an appropriate amount of venture 
capital. That is, enough capital to meet the strategic needs of firm, but not an access amount that 
comes with high costs (Wang & Zhou, 2004). Firms accepting venture capital are dependent on 
that capital to the extent that they are able to operate without it. Thus, the ratio of revenue to 
funding represents how well a firm is capable of meeting its financial requirements without 
outside capital.  
Complementary resource autonomy. Complementary resource autonomy measures the 
level of control over resources that firms have when securing such resources through IORs. In 
order to capture complementary resource autonomy for both high and low commitment resources 
as described above, multiple steps will be taken. First, alliances will be coded using the alliance 
intensity scale developed by Contractor and Lorange (1988) and Nohria and Garcia-Pont (1991). 
The scale rates alliances from 1-9 based on the level of commitment required between alliance 
partners as follows: 1. Distribution agreements. 2. Know-how and patent-licensing agreements. 
3. Component sourcing agreements. 4. Second source agreements. 5. Broad R&D Agreements. 6. 
Minority Equity. 7. Limited Cross Equity Ownership. 8. Independent Joint Ventures. 9. Mergers 
and acquisitions. Relative to lower ratings on the scale, higher ratings represent longer-term and 
more permanent solutions for access to resources. Firms with higher ratings on the alliance 
intensity scale should, all else equal, have higher autonomy due to having stronger control over 
the resource accessed in the alliance. Other factors may clearly influence control over resources 
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beyond the commitment-level of the alliance. Such factors are discussed and measured as control 
variables below. 
To code alliances I will first coded 100 alliances from the sample. Second, a second 
coder coded the same alliances. Coding matched on 82 of 100 alliances. Discrepancies were 
discussed until coding agreements were made. Third, I coded all alliances used in the sample 
based on the coding scheme.  Lastly, an equation is developed based on the alliance intensity 
scale and the alliance concentration measure developed by Ahuja (2000). Whereas Ahuja (2000) 
calculates the level of concentration based on specific alliance partners, complementary resource 
autonomy intends to capture the overall commitment of a firm based on alliance intensity across 
alliance partners. The following equation will be calculated:  
𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 =  �𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴19 + 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴29 +  𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴39 +  𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴49 + ⋯𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛9
𝐶𝐶
 
Where AI represents the coded value of alliance intensity and n represents the total 
number of alliances.  
Moderating Variables 
Board capital. Members of boards of directors are identified through PrivCo, company 
websites, and Relationship Science. Board members LinkedIn profiles are used to gather 
information about their occupational characteristics. Occupations are then coded according to the 
typology put forth by (Hillman et al., 2000). Board interlocks are counted using Relationship 
Science, which provides a thorough list of director positions held. Board capital is a multi-
dimensional measure of the human and social capital of firm directors (Hillman & Dalziel, 
2003). As firms are often required to appoint board members as part of an agreement to secure 
venture capital (Park & Steensma, 2014), the board capital of these members will be examined. 
More specifically, the social capital aspect of board capital is measured as a count of director 
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interlocks (Dalziel, Gentry, & Bowerman, 2011). The human capital aspect of board capital is 
measured using a heterogeneity index (Blau, 1977) of the board’s occupational characteristics 
(Hillman et al., 2000). Occupational background categories include: “…general management, 
finance/accounting, sales/marketing, legal, information systems, operations, engineering, human 
resources, military/government, and real estate” (Haynes & Hillman, 2010 p. 1154). This is 
calculated using the following equation: 
𝐵𝐵𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝐵𝐵 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑐𝑐 = 1 −  ∑(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)2
∑�𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗�
2 
Where xi represents number of individuals with each occupational background and xj represents 
the total of all occupational backgrounds present on the board (Blau, 1977). 
  Complementary human capital. Firm TMTs are first identified through multiple 
sources, including PrivCo, company websites, and LinkedIn. Human capital data from firm 
TMTs was collected from LinkedIn. The previous firms of the TMT as well as whether a TMT 
member previously founded a firm was captured. NAIC codes for each firm were then sourced 
from Mergent Online and Manta.com. Mergent and Manta were also used to locate NAIC codes 
for firm alliance partners.  
Drawing on the measure of complementary resources used by Lin, Yang, and Arya 
(2009), complementary human capital will be measured using the industry-specific human 
capital of the focal firm management team and the industry in which the alliance partner resides. 
The following equation will be calculated:  
𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶 𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 =  ∑𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + ∑𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 − ∑𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  
Where TMTHCi represents the two-digit NAIC code of each industry in which a top 
management team member has experience, APi represents the two-digit NAIC codes of alliance 
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partners, and Mi represents a two-digit NAIC codes present for both the top management team 
and alliance partner. Each of these terms is represented as a count. For example, if a management 
team has experience in industries with four different NAIC codes, an alliance partner has one 
NAIC code, and it matches the NAIC code of the alliance partner, the calculation is: (4 + 1 – 1)/5 
= 0.8. Thus, higher numbers represent a higher level of complementary human capital. 
Additionally, firms may have more than one NAIC code (Wang & Zajac, 2007), which 
theoretically allows for the calculation to be negative. In such instances, it will be assumed that 
no complementary human capital is present and the variable will be set to zero (Lin et al., 2009).   
 
Control Variables 
Industry. Industry will be controlled for using a dummy variable for each two-digit 
NAIC code (Robb & Seamans, 2014).  
Size. Firm size will be measured as the total employees of the firm (Lu & Beamish, 
2006). 
Age. Firm age will be measured as the number of years since the founding of the firm 
(Fink & Harris, 2012).  
Year. The calendar year will be included to control for year-to-year differences 
(Beckman et al., 2004). 
Board size. The total number of members on the board of directors (Beckman et al., 
2004).  
Entrepreneurial human capital. Entrepreneurial human capital will be captured using 
two measures. First, the number of years of industry experience of the founder(s) will be 
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gathered. Second, the number of previous start-ups by the founder(s) will be counted (Unger et 
al., 2011).  
Top management team size. A count of the management team size will be gathered 
(Baum & Silverman, 2004).  
Total number of alliances. A total count of current firm alliances will be gathered 
(Ozmel et al., 2013).  
Venture capital reputation. Prior research shows that the VC firms possessing strong 
reputations select investment targets with higher potential (Sorensen, 2007). To control for these 
possible effects VC reputation is controlled for. As IPOs are typically the most successful 
venture exit for VC firms, the cumulative market capitalization of IPOs backed by the VC is 
used to capture reputation (Nahata, 2008). Following Nahata (2008), these measures will be 
collected over a 10-year period from 2006-2015. Thus, firms in my sample that were founded in 
2010 have at least four years of IPO data from which to draw reputation measures, and firms 
founded in 2015 have ten years. Venture capital reputation is captured using the VentureXpert 
database within SDC Platinum. All publicly traded firms that completed an IPO between the 
years 2005 and 2015 are identified, as well as all investors in the firm, and the market 
capitalization at the end of the first day of trading. The overall market share capitalization of 
IPOs is then calculated for each investor (Nahata, 2008) 
Board monitoring and opportunism. Unlike public firm that have requirements to 
appoint independent directors, private firms do not face the same obligations. Instead, founders 
and VC investors are expected to carry out monitoring of the firm through the board of directors 
(Garg, 2013). However, VCs and funded firms may have differing goals, causing owners to 
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monitor in ways that VCs may not. Thus, board monitoring is thus measured as the ratio of firm 
insiders to board outsiders. To prevent division by zero, 1 is added to the denominator.  
To capture the possibility of opportunistic behavior by firm outsiders, a count of the total 
outsiders is used. Outsider board members are typically appointed by the VC firm (Kaplan & 
Stromberg, 2004). Having more board members gives the VC firm leverage to pursue an exit or 
an early push to profitability when doing so may not be wise (Cumming, 2008). As VCs must 
often return capital to their limited partners, pressures to act opportunistically exist, and firms 
with higher representations of outsiders are thus more likely to face opportunism.  
Analysis  
 Data will be collected that represents different periods of time. This creates non-
independent nested data that requires a mixed-effects model. Mixed-effects models allow for 
analysis of fixed-effects that include all variables regardless of time as well as random-effects 
that include all variables that differ across time in order to capture variables that apply to all 
observations as well as those that change depending on time or other changing effects. To 
perform such analysis the xtmixed command in stata is utilized. This command allows for 
analysis over time as well as multilevel analysis, which in this case involves grouping at the 
industry-level.  
 Examination of the data shows that the dependent variable, firm performance measured 
as revenue growth, has several substantial outliers that are likely to skew results. This is not 
surprising given the nature of the firms in the sample, as young firms are more likely to grow at a 
faster rate (Markman & Gartner, 2002). As firms move from very little revenue to substantial 
revenue in a short period of time firms may occasionally experience revenue growth figures in 
the thousands of percent. Indeed, 24 observations in the data show firms with over 20,000% 
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growth. As such large numbers can substantially effect results, observations greater than two 
standard deviations above the mean were trimmed from the analysis. This resulted in 28 
observations being trimmed. Additionally, robust standard errors are used in the analysis to avoid 
issues related to heteroskedasticity. 
 Hypotheses 1-3 test the direct effect of each type of resource dependence remedy on firm 
performance. Hypotheses 6, 7a, and 7b examine moderation effects. These hypotheses are tested 
using the xtmixed command as described above. Hypotheses 4, 5a, and 5b test mediation. 
Analysis is performed using the sgmediation command in Stata, which performs Sobel-Goodman 
mediation tests. Sobel-Goodman tests can determine the amount, if any, of influence that a 
mediating variable carries from an independent variable to a dependent variable. This test is 
necessary to test mediation, as xtmixed can only examine the relationship between independent 
variables and moderators and a dependent variable. Results can indicate the proportion of the 
total effect that is mediated as well as the significance of each path in the mediation.  
Model fit is assessed using Akaike information criterion (AIC).  
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CHAPTER V: RESULTS 
 Correlations are presented in table 5.1. Board size and board opportunism are found to be 
highly correlated (0.91). To check for multicollinearity a Tolerance level and VIF are calculated.  
The Tolerance level is found to be .997 and the VIF is found to be 1.0. These results fall 
substantially below suggested levels of Tolerance greater than 0.2 and VIF less than 10.0 (Hair et 
al., 2010).  = 1.00. No other variables are found to be highly correlated such that 
multicollinearity may be an issue.  
 Descriptive statistics are presented in table 5.2. Firm performance, measured as revenue 
growth, is present for 2,140 observations out of a possible 3,783. Given that at least two years of 
revenue must be available to calculate growth, this is a reasonable ratio of available observations. 
All other variables have at least as many observations. However, as missing data throughout the 
sample appears to be random, the number of complete observations available for testing is 
reduced to 921. Descriptive statistics also show that the mean of firm performance is equal to 
2.09, but the standard deviation is 7.41, with a maximum value of 200.1. As firm performance is 
measured as a percentage, this means that one firm grew revenue by just over 20,000% percent 
in one year. Growth rates of this magnitude are more than likely due to the timing of when a firm 
begins to earn revenue in a calendar year, or a complete change in the attempt to earn revenue at 
all, rather than the outcome of a strategic decision. As such, observations of firm performance 
greater than two standard deviations above the mean are excluded from analysis as described 
above.  
 Hypotheses 1-3 test the direct effect of financial dependence remedies, high commitment 
complementary remedies and low commitment complementary remedies on firm performance.  
Multiple control variables are also used in the analysis, including board size, board opportunism, 
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board monitoring, entrepreneurial human capital, firm age, firm size, TMT size, and VC 
reputation. Results of H1-H3, as well as the control model, are shown in Table 5.3. Hypothesis 1 
states that financial resource dependence remedies will have a positive relationship with firm 
performance. Results show a positive and significant relationship (Ɓ = 0.458, p < .01), thus 
supporting Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 2 states that high commitment complementary resource 
dependence remedies will have a positive relationship with firm performance. Results fail to find 
support for Hypothesis 2 (Ɓ = 0.185, p = .18). Hypothesis 3 states that low commitment 
complementary resource dependence remedies will have a positive relationship with firm 
performance. Results show a significant but negative effect (Ɓ = -0.099, p < .01), thus failing to 
find support for Hypothesis 3.  
 Hypotheses 4, 5a, and 5b all test mediation between each of previously tested resource 
dependence remedies and firm performance. Mediation is tested using Sobel-Goodman 
mediation. Results of each mediation are shown in Table 5.4. Hypothesis 4 states that financial 
autonomy will mediate the relationship between financial resource dependence remedies and 
firm performance. While financial dependence remedies are shown to have a positive and 
significant relationship with firm performance (Ɓ = 0.572, p <.01) and financial autonomy (Ɓ = -
10.507, p <.01), no relationship was found between financial autonomy and firm performance (Ɓ 
= -0.014, p = .41). Further, none of the Sobel-Goodman Mediation tests are significant. Thus, 
Hypothesis 4 is not supported.  
 Hypothesis 5a states that complementary resource autonomy will mediate the relationship 
between high commitment resource dependence remedies and firm performance. Results show 
that high commitment remedies have a negative and significant effect on firm performance (Ɓ = 
-0.398, p < .05) and that complementary autonomy has a positive and significant (Ɓ = 4.77, p 
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<.01) effect on firm performance. Sobel-Goodman tests are also significant (Ɓ = 0.58, p <.01). 
These results show that mediation is present, however, the negative coefficient of high 
commitment complementary autonomy is counter to the hypothesized relationship. Thus, 
Hypothesis 5a is not supported.  
 Hypothesis 5b states that complementary resource autonomy will mediate the relationship 
between low commitment resource dependence remedies and firm performance. Results show 
that low commitment remedies have a positive and significant relationship with low commitment 
complementary autonomy (Ɓ = 0.04, p <.01), but no relationship is found between low 
commitment remedies and firm performance (Ɓ = -0.029, p = .87) or between low commitment 
complementary autonomy and firm performance (Ɓ = -0.7, p = .44). Sobel-Goodman mediation 
tests are also non-significant. Thus, Hypothesis 5b is not supported.  
 Hypotheses 6, 7a, and 7b test moderation between each of the mediators and firm 
performance. Results are shown in Table 5.7. Hypothesis 6 states that board capital will 
moderate the relationship between financial autonomy and firm performance, such that higher 
levels of board capital will lead to higher levels of firm performance. Board capital is comprised 
of the human and social capital of board members (Hillman et al., 2009), so each aspect of tested 
separately. Board (human) capital is shown to have a negative and significant direct relationship 
with firm performance (Ɓ = -0.95, p < .01). As lower values in the measure of board capital 
represent higher amounts of board capital, this result is expected. However, the moderating effect 
of board (human) capital on firm performance is non-significant (Ɓ = 0.03, p =.22). Board 
(social) capital is also proposed to moderate the relationship between financial autonomy and 
firm performance. No result is found (Ɓ = -0.0001, p = .85). As neither component of board 
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capital is found to moderate the relationship between financial autonomy and firm performance, 
Hypothesis 6 is not supported.  
 Hypothesis 7a examines the moderation of complementary human capital on the 
relationship between high commitment complementary autonomy and firm performance. Results 
show a negative but not significant relationship between the interaction term and firm 
performance (Ɓ = -6.51, p = .07). Hypothesis 7b examines the moderation between low 
commitment complementary autonomy and firm performance. A significant relationship is not 
found (Ɓ = 2.29, p = .39). Thus, Hypothesis 7b is not supported.  
 Table 5.3 also present the full model with all direct effects and moderators. Interestingly, 
Hypothesis 7a finds support in this model (Ɓ = -7.093, p < .05). This and other hypotheses are 
further explored with post-hoc analysis. 
Post-Hoc Analysis 
 Sobel-Goodman mediation tests are only capable of examining one mediating 
relationship of interest at a time. To further explore the mediating relationships proposed 
structural equation modeling (SEM) is used. SEM allows for full and simultaneous estimation of 
the mediation and moderation effects, as compared to the combination of xtmixed and 
sgmediation commands described above. Results are similar to the Sobel-Goodman mediation 
test for Hypotheses 4 and 5a. However, differences arise when testing Hypothesis 5b. Hypothesis 
5b states that complementary autonomy will mediate the relationship between low commitment 
remedies and firm performance. This hypothesis is not supported using the Sobel-Goodman 
method. However, structural equation modeling finds a significant relationship between low 
commitment remedies and complementary autonomy (Ɓ = .08, p <.01), as well as between low 
88 
 
commitment complementary autonomy and firm performance (Ɓ = -2.71, p <.05). As lower 
commitment levels are represented by lower numbers, this lends support to Hypothesis 5b.   
 Hypothesis 7a examines the moderating effect of complementary human capital on the 
relationship between complementary autonomy and firm performance. While regression analysis 
did not find support, the p-value of .07 suggests a relationship may be present. Indeed, SEM 
finds a significant effect (Ɓ = -7.15, p <.05). As lower levels signify less commitment and less 
commitment is proposed to increase firm performance, this lends support to Hypothesis 7a. The 
result is graphed in Figure 5.1. 
 Given non-significant and counter-findings to many of the hypotheses relating to 
complementary resource dependence remedies, further post-hoc analysis is conducted. Research 
shows that venture-backed firms tend to enter more alliances than non-venture-backed firms, and 
but that alliance formation can be a substitute for venture capital (Wang et al., 2012). Thus, 
entering into venture capital funding agreements should have a positive relationship with future 
alliance formation, and alliance formation should have a negative relationship with future 
venture capital funding. These relationships are tested using negative binomial regression, which 
is appropriate for dependent variables made up of counts. Results are shown in Table 5.5. While 
results do find a positive and significant relationship between venture capital funding and future 
IORs (Ɓ = .15, p < 0.01), a positive and significant relationship is also found between IORs and 
future venture capital funding (Ɓ = .032, p < .01). The latter result runs counter to the anticipated 
finding that IORs would reduce the need for future venture capital and thus have a negative 
relationship with future funding. 
 It should be noted that Wang et al. (2012) use a sample dating from 1992 to 2004, well 
before the beginning of the sample used in this dissertation. Additionally, only venture-backed 
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companies were used by Wang et al. (2012), whereas this sample utilizes both venture-back and 
non-venture backed firms. Given the differences in both sample characteristics and empirical 
findings, further research in this area is warranted. Possible avenues for such research are 
discussed in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER VI: DISCUSSION 
 
This dissertation broadly seeks to contribute to literature in resource dependence and firm 
performance. More specifically, the nature of autonomy is examined in terms of the relationship 
between resource dependence remedies and firm growth. Additionally, the human and board 
capital of the TMT and venture board is examined in terms of how it may contribute to growth 
with IORs. Each of these contributions is described below in greater detail.  
Specific Findings 
Hypothesis 1 proposes that financial resource dependence remedies, in the form of 
venture capital, will lead to sales growth. Similar findings hold in numerous studies (e.g., 
Rosenbusch et al., 2013). This result thus further solidifies the relationship and provides a 
starting point for mediating and moderating hypotheses. Hypotheses 2 and 3 examine the 
relationship between high and low commitment complementary remedies, in the form of IORs, 
and sales growth. Previous research examines the relationship between IORs and performance 
(e.g., Lunnan & Haugland, 2008), typically finding positive outcomes stemming from IOR 
formation. However, few studies consider the commitment level of the IOR in addition to the 
type of resource gained (e.g., Katila et al., 2008).  Hypothesis 2 predicts a positive relationship 
between high commitment complementary dependence remedies and sales growth, but is not 
supported. Hypothesis 3 predicts a positive relationship between low commitment 
complementary dependence remedies, but instead finds a significant negative relationship. A 
negative relationship is somewhat surprising. It is certainly possible that such IORs may not lead 
to increased sales growth, but it seems counter-intuitive for an IOR to prevent a firm from 
growing. For such a relationship to hold beyond this sample it would seem that forming such 
IORs would have to be a poor strategic choice that is unrealized by firm owners and managers, 
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or that the goal of such IORs is something considered to be more important than growth. A more 
likely explanation may be the nature of the resource sought. As these are low commitment 
resources, some firms may be able to easily develop such resources internally at a relatively low 
cost. Firms that must seek these resources externally may be expending additional resources to 
do so, causing lower levels of growth.  
Hypotheses 4, 5a, and 5b test the mediation of types of autonomy between their 
respective resource dependence remedies and growth. Hypothesis 4 examines the relationship 
between financial autonomy and growth. Unfortunately, no result was found. As firms must 
eventually stand on their own via the creation of revenue or additional access to capital through 
an IPO, it seems unlikely that a mediating, or perhaps moderating, effect is not present in the 
relationship, despite this non-finding. The measurement of financial autonomy may be 
preventing an effect from being found. This possibility is further discussed in the limitations 
section.   
Hypothesis 5a tests the relationship between high commitment resource dependence 
remedies and high commitment complementary autonomy. While a significant result is found in 
post-hoc analysis, the coefficient is opposite of the predicted direction. Lower levels of 
commitment, represented by lower values in the complementary autonomy variable, would 
produce a negative coefficient if the hypothesis was supported. The positive coefficient instead 
means that within high commitment complementary remedies, higher commitment levels lead to 
firm growth. One possible explanation is that the highest level of commitment, an acquisition, 
may also bring added revenue to the firm. While any type of growth clearly shows up the same 
in measures of revenue, other measures of efficiency or profitability may suffer, causing medium 
and long-term issues for the firm. Further, as high commitment resources are by definition more 
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difficult to obtain, having a higher commitment level may reduce uncertainty in the firm, 
allowing for strategic decisions that better promote growth. High commitment levels may also 
simply give permanent access to a needed resource, compared to the possible temporary access 
of a lower commitment level.  
Hypothesis 5b tests the relationship between low commitment resource dependence 
remedies and low commitment complementary autonomy. Sobel-Goodman mediation tests fail 
to find a significant result. However, SEM finds that low commitment complementary autonomy 
negatively mediates the relationship between low commitment remedies and sales growth. This 
is an interesting finding compared to the Sobel-Goodman result and the finding of H3, which 
identifies a negative relationship between low commitment remedies and sales growth. SEM 
instead identified no direct relationship between low commitment remedies and sales growth, but 
instead a positive relationship between low commitment remedies and low commitment 
complementary autonomy, followed by a negative relationship between such autonomy and sales 
growth. This result supports H5b, as lower commitment levels lead to higher growth. This is the 
logical result, as firms seeking low commitment resources externally should not have to make a 
large commitment to secure such resources.  Firms able to do this are likely acquiring resources 
needed for further commercial development of their product or service (Teece, 1986) at a low 
cost, whereas firm that must make a large commitment then suffer lower performance.  
Hypotheses 6, 7a, and 7b examine moderation between each of the mediating variables 
and growth. Board capital is examined separately in terms of the human and social capital of the 
board. No result is found for either measure. As with financial autonomy itself, the issue may be 
due to the measurement of the mediating variable. Hypothesis 7a tests complementary human 
capital as a moderator between high commitment complementary autonomy and sales growth. 
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Results show that higher levels of complementary human capital increase sales growth. While 
the result of Hypothesis 5a is counter to the expected result, results of this moderation appear to 
give further credence to the explanation that higher levels of commitment are preferred when 
dealing with high commitment resources. As both parties are firmly committed, the presence of 
complementary human capital creates additional benefits that are more likely to be leveraged 
than if commitment levels were lower.  
Hypothesis 7b tests complementary human capital as a moderator between low 
commitment complementary autonomy and sales growth. No effect is found. While 
complementary human capital is shown to be useful in high commitment contexts, it does not 
appear to be effective in these situations. The result of Hypothesis 5b from the SEM analysis 
may shed light on this non-finding. If firms are indeed securing resources with low levels of 
commitment and experiencing sales growth from doing so, they effect of complementary human 
capital in such situations may be irrelevant. Firms may be securing a resource in a straight-
forward and agreed-upon manner, and then continuing with their strategic plan without the need 
to work together with the IOR partner for additional success.   
Post-hoc analysis also finds an interesting relationship between IORs and funding. Firms 
with more funding rounds are more likely to engage in IORs after acquiring funding. Taken 
together with the non-finding between IORs and growth, an interesting plausible story emerges. 
It may be the case that firms seek funding for growth, but engage in IORs for other purposes. For 
example, firms may seek a resource that is not available internally, but be doing so as a strategic 
choice. It may be less costly to engage in an IOR to secure that resource than to develop it 
internally. As such, an IOR meeting this criterion may be more likely to lead to profitability than 
growth.  
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Contributions 
This dissertation makes several contributions to extant literature. First, results of the 
literature review demonstrate that autonomy is an overlooked aspect of IORs, despite being 
central to RDT (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), and being a key mediator in the relationship between 
IORs and firm performance (Drees & Huegens, 2013). The lack of attention directly relating to 
autonomy is even more pronounced given that many studies claimed to study autonomy do not 
actually use the term (Drees & Huegens, 2013). Further, autonomy is often measured in very 
different ways, such as access to financial resources (e.g., Honig et al., 2006), acquisitions (e.g., 
Teerikangas, 2012) or CEO succession (e.g., Eklund et al., 2013). By examining key theoretical 
arguments surrounding autonomy (Pfeffer, 1987; Oliver, 1991a), this dissertation proposes that 
autonomy has three distinct mechanisms: the ability to respond to contingencies, the ability to 
avoid opportunistic behavior, and the ability to meet multiple demands. Recognizing these 
mechanisms of autonomy can future researchers distinguish what, exactly, firms are trying to 
accomplish in a quest for autonomy. They may also provide a foundation for building additional 
theory and empirical research seeking to identify the antecedents and outcomes of each specific 
mechanism.  
A second contribution of this dissertation involves the nature of resources being sought in 
IORs.  Firms engaging in IORs are seeking resources, but the nature of the resource being sought 
is also frequently overlooked or only casually examined. This dissertation contributes by 
developing theory about the nature of the resources sought by the firm. Firms enter IORs 
ultimately seeking remedies for dependence, but little research asks the question “dependence on 
what?”. By distinguishing between financial and complementary resources a greater ability to 
explain and predict outcomes is gained. For example, a firm seeking capital to pursue expansion 
95 
 
of retail locations may be seeking to remedy this dependence through a venture capital 
arrangement. However, venture capital funding alone is unlikely to remedy dependence if a firm 
is seeking to develop a new pharmaceutical drug and lacks technical expertise, or cannot 
successfully develop cloud technology needed for their software. Further, all complementary 
resources are not the same. Some resources, such as manufacturing, require higher levels of 
commitment than others, such as marketing (Katila et al., 2008). This dissertation recognizes this 
distinction by dividing complementary resources into high and low commitment complementary 
resources (Katila et al., 2008; Das et al., 1998).  
A third contribution is found in the empirical results of H5a and H5b. While neither 
hypothesis is supported in the initial analysis, H5a is significant in the opposite direction and 
post-hoc SEM analysis finds support for H5b. These findings support the notion that autonomy 
mediates the relationship between resource dependence remedies and firm performance (Drees & 
Huegens, 2013). Perhaps more importantly, they do so in a theoretically grounded manner. As 
the majority of studies focusing on resource dependence only casually mention autonomy, or 
ignore it entirely, questions remain regarding what constitutes autonomy and how it relates to 
various outcomes. This dissertation begins to answer these questions by distinguishing three 
separate mechanisms of autonomy and finding empirical support for how two of those 
mechanisms, the ability to avoid opportunistic behavior and the ability to meet multiple demands 
simultaneously, relate to firm performance.  
Further, high and low commitment complementary autonomy are found to have differing 
relationships with firm performance. High commitment complementary autonomy is 
hypothesized to lead to higher growth at lower commitment levels. However, higher 
commitment levels are found to lead to higher growth. While this is not the expected 
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relationship, it is also not illogical. As high commitment resources are rarer and more difficult to 
access, securing them at a high commitment level may allow firms long-term stability that more 
easily leads to firm growth. Conversely, as low commitment complementary resources are more 
common and easier to access, firms should not have to undertake a large commitment to access 
these resources. Overall, these findings suggest that not all IORs lead to firm performance 
equally, and that both the nature of the resource and the commitment required to secure the 
resource should be considered when evaluating firm performance.  
A fourth contribution involves the human capital of a firm’s TMT. Human capital is 
shown to have numerous positive outcomes (e.g., Unger at al., 2011) for individuals and firms. 
This dissertation extends these findings by examining how the human capital of a TMT can 
benefit the firm in a presence of specific IORs. Results of Hypothesis 7a show that 
complementary human capital moderates the relationship between high commitment 
complementary autonomy and revenue growth. This result seems especially important given the 
unexpected finding in Hypothesis 5a. Pfeffer (1987) states that remedies for dependence are 
likely to cause new dependencies, making any remedy less than fully effective. Hypothesis 7a 
argues that complementary human capital can instead create the opportunity for both IOR 
partners to work together for mutual benefit, rather than working to create a situation of 
dependence that may not result in higher performance (Gulati & Sytch, 2007). As higher 
commitment levels are shown to mediate the relationship between high commitment 
complementary remedies and firm performance, and higher commitment levels may create 
dependent situations, complementary human capital may play a very critical role in such 
relationships.  
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Finally, results of post-hoc analysis may shed light on the relationship between funding 
and alliances and how each effect firm performance. Research suggests that venture capital 
funding and alliances may be substitutes for each other (Wang et al., 2012). However, this 
dissertation finds no relationship or a negative relationship between complementary resource 
dependence remedies and revenue growth, but does find a significant relationship between 
funding and growth. Further, results of negative binomial regression suggest that venture capital 
funding leads to future IORs. As young firms have few resources of their own, this result makes 
logical sense. Firms may be unable to enter into IORs due to a lack of resources available to 
offer an IOR partner in exchange for other resources. However, firms that first obtain venture 
capital funding are more likely to build valuable resources that can then be utilized in IORs, 
allowing them greater access to such opportunities.  
Limitations  
 Like all studies, this dissertation has limitations. First, using private companies for the 
sample is less reliable than using public firms. Private firms are not legally required to announce 
financial results or other activities in the same manner as public firms, creating the possibility 
that available data consists more of data that firms want released, rather than a complete picture. 
However, the sources used here are typically reliable, and such data is becoming more readily 
available as firms are emerging to capture and sell such data (e.g., PrivCo, Pitchbook, etc.).  
  One specific issue with related to the use of private firms is the number of observations 
present for IORs.  Just over 2,000 observations of the dependent variable, revenue growth, are 
present. Over 3,000 financial resource dependence remedies are also captured. However, only 
152 high commitment complementary resource dependence remedies and 382 low commitment 
complementary resource dependence remedies are found. Given that these observations are 
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captured via firm websites and the Factiva database, it is unlikely that substantial observations 
for these variables are both present and available to be collected. Firms may of course enter into 
IORs without media coverage or making an announcement, but the extent to which this may be 
occurring is unknown. However, given that significant effects are found with only a small 
number of observations, it seems likely that any missing observations would only shed additional 
light on what appears to be a significant relationship.  
 Second, some variables are not able to be measured in the preferred way. Financial 
autonomy, measured here as the ratio of revenue to funding, is conceptualized as how well a firm 
can handle unforeseen contingencies that may arise. As such, a ratio of cash to total annual 
expenses would more accurately indicate how well a firm can meet its expected obligations 
(George, 2005) while also having a cushion for unforeseen expenses that extend beyond the short 
term. While this ratio is preferred, the measure used in this dissertation is not without merit. The 
ratio of revenue to funding captures the ability of a firm to stand on its own to operate. Firms 
seeking venture capital are typically focused on growth (Zacharakis et al., 2012) and are less 
concerned about profitability. It is thus likely that a large percentage of funds that are available 
are used for the operation and growth of the firm. Additionally, owners are incentivized to accept 
venture capital in the amount required, as accepting additional capital results in costly equity 
payments and accepting less may result the need to simply raise more capital soon or make 
suboptimal strategic decisions. As firms sell larger equity stakes for funding, future funding 
opportunities will eventually dissipate. Therefore, firms with higher ratios of revenue to funding 
are expected to have greater access to future funding and thus greater financial autonomy. Future 
research examining financial autonomy in the context of entrepreneurial firms should consider 
survey research or other creative measures, as data pertaining to cash positions and annual 
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expenses are unlikely to be widely available. Indeed, this data was sought from numerous 
sources that collect information on private companies, including PrivCo, Mergent, 
ReferenceUSA, and Pitchbook, without success. 
 Board opportunism, measured as the number of outsiders on the board of directors, may 
also be best measured in a different manner. Venture capital firms may have dozens or even 
hundreds of firms in their investment portfolio. The mean number of interlocks present on boards 
in this sample is 16.44, the majority of which are due to board members placed by venture 
capital firms.  While their presence, as compared to absence, certainly increases the likelihood of 
opportunistic behavior taking place, the number of board members spend with the firm may be a 
better indicator of opportunism (Gabrielsson & Huse, 2002). Again, exploring such a concept in 
entrepreneurial firms may be best done via survey research. However, given that opportunism is 
used as a control variable rather than an independent variable of primary interest, the 
measurement of outsiders likely suffices.  
 Board monitoring, measured as the ratio of insiders to outsiders plus one, also suffers 
from limitations. Adding one to the denominator of the ratio prevents divisions by zero and the 
creation of missing data, but also creates a non-linear transformation. For example, a firm with 
one insider and zero outsiders has a ratio of 1.0, a firm with one insider and one outsider has a 
ratio of 0.5, and a firm with one insider and two outsiders has a ratio of 0.33. The inverse of this 
ratio, outsiders divided by insiders, may prevent the majority of data from being lost while not 
causing this issue, as most firms have at least one insider on the board. However, in instances 
where there are no insiders, data would be missing when it is actually a situation ripe for heavy 
monitoring. This causes the removal of what would otherwise by the maximum values for 
monitoring in the sample.  
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 Another limitation deals with the names of high and low complementary remedies 
and autonomy. This dissertation builds on existing research by Katila et al. (2008) by using the 
concepts of high and low commitment complementary resources and then naming them 
accordingly. Further, high and low complementary autonomy are proposed to mediate the 
relationship between each remedy and performance, matching the names of the resources. While 
these labels are based on descriptions from established literature (Katila et al., 2008), they may 
also be potentially misleading. This is due to the predictions made in hypotheses 5a and 5b, 
which state that lower commitment levels will positively mediate the relationship between 
remedies and performance. The hypotheses are discussing the commitment level of the remedy 
based on its structure (e.g., distribution agreement, independent joint venture, etc.), while high 
and low commitment remedies are labels assigned based on the specific resource sought in the 
IOR (e.g., advertising, manufacturing, etc.). The use of high and low commitment as descriptors 
for both the type and structure of the remedy may create unnecessary difficulty in explaining the 
concepts, regardless of their previous establishment in the literature.  
Going forward, it is likely wise to relabel high and low commitment complementary 
remedies as well as high and low commitment autonomy. Relabeling all of these constructs can 
create a clearer distinction between the remedies, the mechanism driving each type of autonomy, 
and also allow the stated hypotheses to continue using the accurate description of lower 
commitment levels being required for mediation. Further, the theoretical foundations for each 
construct will remain unchanged.  
First, high commitment complementary resources could be renamed direct resources. 
High commitment complementary resources grant access to rarer, scarce, resources that are 
likely to require fixed costs (Katila et al., 2008). An examination of IORs in this sample suggests 
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that these resources are likely to be directly linked to the development or sale of a firm’s 
products or services. For example, multiple firms in the sample entered into IORs with other 
firms with the intent to integrate their respective software products to offer a superior product to 
specific customers or create additional benefits for existing customers. Thus, the label direct 
resources clearly describes how the resource will be used and distinguishes it from low 
commitment complementary resources, which could be renamed indirect resources. Examination 
of the IORs in the sample suggests that low commitment complementary resources grant access 
to resources such as advertising, marketing, and distribution. These are clearly indirect 
resources. This label may be superior to low commitment complementary resources, as it more 
precisely describes the nature of the resources and offers a clear distinction from direct 
resources.  
Finally, high and low commitment complementary autonomy, which are named to match 
the resource that they mediate, should also thus be renamed. One contribution of this dissertation 
is recognition of the need for theoretical development of autonomy and the proposal of three 
mechanisms of autonomy each working in conjunction with a specific resource. High and low 
complementary autonomy, which accurate descriptions, do not refer to the theoretical 
mechanism that drives each type of autonomy. High commitment complementary autonomy is 
defined as the ability to avoid opportunistic behavior, and could thus be renamed opportunistic 
autonomy. Low commitment complementary autonomy is defined as the ability to meet multiple 
demands simultaneously, suggesting a choice from multiple options, and could thus be renamed 
matrix autonomy. 
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Future Research 
 Results suggest several possible avenues for future research that may be fruitful. First, the 
relationship between low commitment complementary resource dependence remedies and 
growth is shown to be negative, counter to what is hypothesized. Logically, such IORs should 
help a firm continue to grow, or at least not hinder growth. A negative relationship may suggest 
that firms unable to internally develop resources needed for the continued development of the 
firm (Das et al., 1998). Future research could further explore the link between such IORs and 
firm performance while also examining the resource capabilities of the firm.  
 Next, the theoretical arguments described in Chapter III merit further investigation, 
especially given the limitations outlined above. While financial autonomy in private firms is 
unlikely to be captured using a measure of cash/total expenses, other options may exist. Firms 
that acquire funding do so in exchange for a percentage of equity. The percentage of equity is 
sometimes, but not always, available. This percentage may also be derived if the overall 
valuation of the firm during a particular funding event is known, as it could simply be used in a 
ratio of funds given to valuation. Obtaining such a measure and using it in conjunction with the 
ratio of revenue to funding used here can provide a more detailed look at financial autonomy. 
Specifically, researchers would know how well the firm is currently standing on its own via the 
ratio of revenue to funding, and have some indication of how much external funding may still be 
available. Firms highly dependent on outside funding that have only sold a small percentage of 
equity should have, all else equal, greater financial autonomy than firms that have sold a higher 
percentage of equity.  
 Results of Hypotheses 5a, 5b, 7a, and 7b also suggest avenues for future research. As 
different types of analyses find different results, and some results are counter to those 
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hypothesized, future research should reconsider the theoretical argument presented here, 
carefully select appropriate analysis for the sample that is collected, and work to further support 
these relationships or identify potential weaknesses in them.  
 Next, while the moderating effect of board capital on financial autonomy is not 
significant, the non-finding could be due to the previously mentioned issues with the 
measurement of financial autonomy. Further, results point to a potentially promising avenue of 
investigation. Results show that the direct effect between the human capital aspect of board 
capital and revenue growth is negative and significant. As lower numbers represent higher 
amounts of board capital, this suggests that board capital positively influences revenue growth 
and is worthy of future investigation as both a direct effect and a moderator.  
 Next, while autonomy is established as a mediator between remedies and performance 
(Drees & Huegens, 2013), there may be other important relationships. For example, autonomy is 
measured at a point in time in this dissertation. However, it changes over time and that change 
may also be relevant to firm performance or other outcomes of interest. Another possibility is 
that autonomy may have a non-linear effect. It seems reasonable that some lower levels of 
autonomy, such as those involving distribution or licensing agreements, may not produce a 
significantly different effect from each other. At higher levels, though, there is a clearer 
difference between an independent joint venture and an acquisition. Mathematically, these 
differences are much closer than they may be in practice. Future research could further develop 
this logic and propose non-linear effects.  
 Finally, future research could propose a finer-grained measure of complementary 
resources. While some resources are clearly high commitment (e.g., manufacturing) and some 
are clearly low commitment (e.g., advertising), some are not so clear (e.g., technology). Drawing 
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on the arguments outlined above for possible renaming of high and low complementary 
resources, the level of commitment could perhaps instead be measured by how necessary the 
resource is for the primary operations of the firm. For example, a company that sells products is 
clearly highly dependent on manufacturing to produce the product, but likely less dependent on a 
supplier of food for the company cafeteria. Conversely, a restaurant that specializes in a certain 
cuisine may be dependent on the supplier of the ingredients, but not dependent on the 
manufacturer used to create products for customers to purchase and take home. This relatedness 
to core business operations may perhaps be measured using the industries of the partners. Firms 
in the same industry would be more likely to indicate a resource necessary for the core business 
that carry higher commitments, while firms in different industries may be more likely to indicate 
resources that are not directly related to the core business. 
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CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSION 
 The overall goal of this dissertation is to expand and examine concepts surrounding inter-
organizational relationships. Findings suggest that the theoretical distinctions made between 
different types of resources and different mechanisms of autonomy likely have merit. 
Specifically, the nature of resources being accessed through an IOR are shown to be a critical 
component of the relationship between IORs and firm performance, and that the level of 
commitment that firms should undertake when entering into IORs should vary depending on the 
resource sought. Further, additional factors beyond the resource sought and the commitment 
level present in securing that resource are also considered. Results suggest that the potential for 
IOR partners to work together for mutual gain is important in high commitment situations, but 
not a factor in low commitment situations.  
 The broad topics related to resource dependence explored in this dissertation have been 
examined for decades with many advances. However, the specific questions asked here have yet 
to be answered, despite acknowledgements that resource dependence theory is often used as a 
metaphor rather than a theoretical foundation (Wry et al., 2011), and that remedies for 
dependence lead to firm performance in different ways that are currently unknown (Drees & 
Huegens, 2013). This dissertation attempts to advance resource dependence theory and its related 
concepts by studying these questions. Overall, the theory presented and empirical results found 
begin to shed light on these areas and lays a path for future research to make additional advances.  
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theory 
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Teerikangas, 
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theory 
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Stability 
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Wadhwa & 
Kotha, 2006 AMJ Financial 
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Phenomen
on driven 
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Stability 
Walters, 
Kroll, & 
Wright, 
2010 
AMJ Financial Board of directors 
Agency 
theory; 
Stewardshi
p theory 
Power Balance 
Wijbenga, 
Postma, & 
Stratling, 
2007 
ET&P Complementary Venture Capital firm services 
Agency 
theory; 
Resource 
dependenc
e theory 
Power Balance 
Woodcock, 
Beamish, & 
Makino, 
1994 
JIBS Financial Market entry 
Contingen
cy theory Resource 
Stability 
Yoo, 
Schenkel, & 
Kim, 2014 
JSBM Financial Board of directors 
Agency 
theory; 
Stewardshi
p theory; 
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theory 
Power Balance 
Zahra, 1995 JBV Financial Buyouts Agency theory 
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Stability 
Zahra & 
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Figure 3.1. Model. 
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Table 5.1. Summary 
Statistics.       
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Firm Performance 2,140 2.09 7.41 -1 200.01 
Fin. Dependence Remedy 3,711 1.09 0.71 0 5.00 
High Commit. Comp. 
Remedy 3,802 0.12 0.45 0 5.00 
Low Commit. Comp. 
Remedy 3,802 0.34 1.07 0 14.00 
      
Financial Autonomy 3,058 8.92 7.65 0 22.55 
High Commit. Comp. Auto. 3,800 0.03 0.08 0 1.00 
Low Commit Comp. Auto. 3,800 0.05 0.08 0 0.56 
Firm Size 2,974 117.89 556.41 0 15,000 
      
Comp. Human Cap.  3,802 0.10 0.18 0 1.00 
Board (Human) Capital 2,155 .055 .294 .016 1 
Board (Social) Capital 3,757 16.45 27.68 0 212 
      
Board Size 2,196 3.97 2.22 1 12 
VC Reputation 3,775 0.00 0.01 0 0.27 
Ent. Human Capital 3,775 2.07 2.44 0 18 
Board Monitoring 2,187 0.18 0.53 0 6.00 
Board Opportunism 2,187 3.53 2.19 0 11.00 
Firm Age 3,776 3.11 2.08 0 9.00 
TMT Size 2,934 3.50 2.35 1 13.00 
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 Table 5.2. Correlation Matrix.             
 Firm 
Perf. 
Fin. 
Dep. 
Remedy 
High 
Commit. 
Remedy 
Low 
Commit. 
Remedy 
Comp. 
Human 
Cap.  
High 
Commit. 
Auto. 
Low 
Commit 
Auto. 
Firm 
Size 
TMT 
Size 
Board 
Size 
VC  
Rep. 
Ent 
Human 
Cap. 
Board 
Mon. 
Board 
Opp. 
Firm 
Age 
Firm 
Performance 1               
Fin. Dep. 
Remedy 0.04 1              
High 
Commit. 
Remedy -0.04 0.05** 1             
Low 
Commit. 
Remedy -0.05* 0.04* 0.47** 1            
Comp. 
Human Cap.  -0.02 0.08** 0.39** 0.58** 1           
High 
Commit. 
Auto. 0.04 0.09** 0.59** 0.21** 0.31** 1          
Low 
Commit 
Auto. -0.01 0.08** 0.26** 0.48** 0.66** 0.31** 1         
Firm Size -0.03 -0.01 0.07** 0.07** 0.01 0.08** 0.11** 1        
TMT Size 0.06 -0.07** -0.005 0.04* 0.03 0.06** 0.07** 0.03 1       
Board Size 0.00 0.02 0.10** 0.11** 0.19** 0.12** 0.15** 0.07** 0.08** 1      
VC 
Reputation 0 0.03* -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0 0.02 -0.03 1     
Ent. Human 
Cap. 0.03 -0.11** 0.02 0.06** 0.06** 0.05** 0.08** -0.01 0.36** 0.03 0.01 1    
Board 
Monitoring -0.03 0 0.01 0.08** 0.08** 0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.08** 0.05* 0 -0.09** 1   
Board Opp. 0.02 0 0.07** 0.07** 0.14** 0.08** 0.12** 0.07** 0.12** 0.91** -0.02 0.08** -0.3** 1  
Firm Age -0.20** 0.10** 0.25** 0.34** 0.13** 0.03* 0.08** 0.11** -0.10** 0.05** -0.06** -0.09** 0.02 0.04 1 
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Table 5.3. Mixed-Effects Regression Analysis.    
Dependent Variables: Firm Performance (Sales Growth)  
Variable  Model 1: Controls 
Model 2: 
Main Effects Model 3: Moderation 
     
Financial Remedy   0.458** 0.252 
High Commitment 
Complementary 
Remedy   0.185 -0.266 
Low Commitment 
Complementary 
Remedy    -0.099** 0.029      
Financial Autonomy    -0.033 
High Commit. Comp. Auto   6.186** 
Low Commit. Comp. Auto    -2.383*      
Comp. Human Capital    -0.162 
High Commit. Comp. Auto     -7.093* 
* Comp. Human Cap     
Low Commit. Comp. Auto    3.472 
* Comp. Human Cap          
Board (Human) Capital     -0.98** 
Board (Human) Capital     0.024 
* Fin. Autonomy     
Board (Social) Capital    0.002 
Board (Social) Capital     0 
* Fin. Autonomy          
Board Size  0.079 0.029 0.026 
Board Opportunism  -0.062 -0.015 -0.061 
Ent. Human Capital   -0.048*  -0.04* -0.036 
Firm Age   -0.628**  -0.71**  -0.566** 
VC Reputation   -3.25**  -5.098*  -6.987** 
Firm Size   -0**  -0.00**  -0.001** 
TMT Size  -0.03 -0.144  -0.061** 
Board Monitoring   -0.24* -0.03 -0.203      
Year:     
2009  3.98** 3.84** 3.517** 
2010  3.54** 3.48** 3.055** 
2011  3.93** 3.97** 3.348** 
2012  3.62** 3.75** 3.013** 
2013  4.03** 4.26** 3.468** 
2014  4.3** 4.58** 3.635** 
2015  4.44** 4.83** 3.788** 
2016  3.28** 3.66** 2.474** 
2017  2.84** 2.83** 1.667**      
Intercept  .12**  -0.326** 1.265** 
N  921 921 885 
Wald χ2  164.61** 191.47** 223.96** 
Log-Likelihood  -1972.45 -1961.2 -1855.81 
AIC (df)  3984.91 (20) 3968.39 (23)  
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Table 5.4. Sobel-Goodman 
Mediation – Financial Autonomy    
 
     
Model with dv regressed     
 
Model with mediator regressed   
Model with dv regressed 
on   
on iv (path c)    on iv (path a)    mediator and iv (paths b and c')  
 SS df MS SS  df MS SS df MS 
           
Model 799.96 18 44.44 41377.53  18 2298.75 802.87 19 42.26 
Residual 3832.65 915 4.19 14427.73  915 15.77 3829.74 914 4.19 
Total 4632.606 933 4.965 55805.262  933 59.813 4632.606 933 4.965 
           
N = 934 F(18, 915) = 10.61  N = 934  F(18,915) = 145.79 N = 934 F(19, 914) = 10.08 
Root MSE = 2.05 Prob > F = 0  Root MSE = 3.97  Prob > F = 0   Root MSE = 2.05 Prob > F = 0  
R2 = 0.17 Adj R2 = 0.16  R2 = 0.74  Adj R2 = 0.74  R2 = 0.17 Adj R2 = 0.16 
           
Firm Performance Coef.   Financial Autonomy  Coef.  Firm Performance Coef.  
           
Financial Dependence 
Remedy 0.572 **  
Financial Dependence 
Remedy 
 
-10.507 ** Financial Autonomy -0.014  
Board Size 0.033   Board Size 
 
-0.538 * 
Financial Dependence 
Remedy 0.423  
Board Opportunism -0.023   Board Opportunism  0.429  Board Size 0.025  
Ent. Human Capital -0.056   Ent. Human Capital  -0.030  Board Opportunism -0.017  
Firm Age -0.473 **  Firm Age  0.049  Ent. Human Capital -0.056  
VC Repuation -8.252   VC Repuation  32.892  Firm Age -0.472  
Firm Size 0.000   Firm Size  0.001 ** VC Repuation -7.785  
Board Monitoring -0.152   Board Monitoring  0.634  Firm Size 0.000  
TMT Size -0.041   TMT Size  -0.055  Board Monitoring -0.143  
Intercept 2.696 **  Intercept  24.654 ** TMT Size -0.041  
        Intercept 3.046 ** 
Sobel-Goodman Mediation Tests          
           
Sobel 0.14919819    Proportion of total effect mediated 0.26092214 Indirect effect =  0.149198  
Goodman-1 (Aroian) 0.14919819    Ratio of indirect to direct effect: 0.35303741 Direct effect =  0.422613  
Goodman-2 0.14919819    Ratio of total to direct effect: 1.3530374 Total effect =  0.571811  
a coefficient =  -10.508**          
b coefficient = -0.014199          
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Table 5.5. Sobel-Goodman Mediation – 
High Commitment Complementary 
Autonomy         
Model with dv regressed     Model with mediator regressed   
Model with dv regressed 
on   
on iv (path c)    on iv (path a)   mediator and iv (paths b and c')  
 SS df MS SS df MS SS df MS 
          
Model 694.540 18 38.586 3.676 18 0.2042 769.02 19 40.47 
Residual 3938.066 915 4.304 3.276 915 0.0036 3863.58 914 4.23 
Total 4632.606 933 4.965 6.953 933 0.0075 4632.606 933 4.965 
          
N = 934 F(18, 934) = 8.97  N = 934 F(18,934) = 57.04 N = 934 F(19, 934) = 9.58 
Root MSE = 2.07 Prob > F = 0  Root MSE = .059 Prob > F = 0   Root MSE = 2.056 Prob > F =  
R2 = 0.16 Adj R2 = 0.13  R2 = .53 Adj R2 = .52  R2 = .166 Adj R2 = .149 
          
Firm Performance Coef.   
High Commit. Comp. 
Auto. Coef.  Firm Performance Coef.            
High Commit. Remedy 0.181   High Commit. Remedy 0.122 ** 
High Commit. Comp. 
Auto. 4.770 ** 
Board Size 0.068   Board Size 0.015 ** High Commit. Remedy -0.398 * 
Board Opportunism -0.059   Board Opportunism -0.015 ** Board Size -0.005  
Ent. Human Capital -0.055   Ent. Human Capital 0.001  Board Opportunism 0.013  
Firm Age -0.479 **  Firm Age -0.008  Ent. Human Capital 
-
59.000  
VC Repuation -4.631   VC Repuation 0.2  Firm Age -0.441 ** 
Firm Size 0   Firm Size 0.00E+00 ** VC Repuation -5.588  
Board Monitoring -0.253   Board Monitoring -0.15  Firm Size 0.000 ** 
TMT Size -0.03   TMT Size 0.001  Board Monitoring -0.182  
Intercept 3.49 **  Intercept 0.035 ** TMT Size -0.034  
       Intercept 3.330 ** 
Sobel-Goodman Mediation Tests                   
Sobel 0.58 **        
Goodman-1 (Aroian) 0.58 **  Indirect effect =  0.58 ** Proportion of total effect mediated 3.189 
Goodman-2 0.58 **  Direct effect =  -0.39 ** Ratio of indirect to direct effect: -1.46 
a coefficient = 0.122 **  Total effect =  0.182  
Ratio of total to direct 
effect:  -0.457 
b coefficient = 4.77 **        
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Table 5.6. Sobel-Goodman Mediation – Low Commitment 
Complementary Autonomy       
Model with dv regressed     Model with mediator regressed   
Model with dv regressed 
on   
on iv (path c)    on iv (path a)   mediator and iv (paths b and c')  
 SS df MS SS df MS SS df MS 
          
Model 689.90 18 38.33 2.56 18 0.14 692.50 19 36.45 
Residual 3942.70 915 4.31 5 915 0.01 3940.10473 914 4.31 
Total 4632.606 933 4.965 7.868 933 0.008 4632.606 933 4.965 
          
N = 934 F(18, 934) = 8.89  N = 934 F(18,915) = 24.52 N = 934 F(19, 914) = 8.45 
Root MSE = 2.08 Prob > F = 0  Root MSE = .076 Prob > F = 0   Root MSE = 2.07 Prob > F = 0  
R2 = 0.15 Adj R2 = 0.13  R2 = 0.323 Adj R2 = 0.31  R2 = 0.15 Adj R2 = 0.13 
          
Firm Performance Coef.   
Low Commit. Comp. 
Auto. Coef.  Firm Performance Coef.  
          
Low Commit. Comp. 
Remedy. -0.039   
Low Commit. Comp. 
Remedy. 0.040 ** 
Low Commit. Comp. 
Auto. -0.700  
Board Size 0.093   Board Size 0.021 ** 
Low Commit. Comp. 
Remedy. -0.011  
Board Opportunism -0.079   Board Opportunism -0.020 ** Board Size 0.109  
Ent. Human Capital -0.050   Ent. Human Capital 0.001  Board Opportunism -0.094  
Firm Age -0.465 **  Firm Age -0.005 * Ent. Human Capital -0.050  
VC Repuation -4.540   VC Repuation 0.798 * Firm Age -0.469 ** 
Firm Size 0.000 **  Firm Size 0.000 ** VC Repuation -3.975  
Board Monitoring -0.279   Board Monitoring -0.032 ** Firm Size 0.000 * 
TMT Size -0.290   TMT Size 0.000  Board Monitoring -0.301  
Intercept 3.450 **  Intercept 0.050 ** TMT Size -0.029  
       Intercept 3.76 ** 
Sobel-Goodman Mediation Tests         
          
Sobel 0.028   Indirect effect =  -0.028  Proportion of total effect mediated 0.711 
Goodman-1 (Aroian) 0.028   Direct effect =  -0.011  Ratio of indirect to direct effect: 2.46 
Goodman-2 0.028   Total effect =  -0.039  
Ratio of total to direct 
effect:  3.46 
a coefficient = 0.039 **        
b coefficient = -0.699         
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Table 5.7. Mixed-Effects Regression Analysis.  DV: Firm Performance (Sales Growth)  
Variable Model 1: Board Human Cap. 
Model 2: Board 
Social Cap. 
Model 3: 
Comp. Human 
Cap. (High 
Auto) 
Model 4: 
Comp. 
Human 
Cap. (Low 
Auto) 
Financial Autonomy -0.05** -0.04**   
High Commit. Comp. Auto   5.3**  
Low Commit. Comp. Auto    -1.17* 
     
Comp. Human Capital   -0.48** -0.44 
High Commit. Comp. Auto    -6.51†  
* Comp. Human Cap     
Low Commit. Comp. Auto     2.29 
* Comp. Human Cap     
     
Board (Human) Capital -0.95**    
Board (H) Capital * Fin. Auto. 0.03    
Board (S) Capital  0.00   
Board (S) Capital * Fin. Auto.  -0.00        
Board Size 0.04 -0.01 0.05 0.12 
Board Opportunism -0.18 -0.09 -0.2 -0.31* 
Ent. Human Capital -0.04 -0.05** -0.04* -0.05† 
Firm Age -0.53** -0.59** -0.61** -0.61** 
VC Reputation -7.73** -5.39** -4.6** -2.43* 
Firm Size -0.00** -.00** -0.00** -0.00** 
TMT Size -0.54** -0.04** -0.03 -0.03 
Board Monitoring -0.05 0.01 -0.03 -0.1 
Year:     
2009 3.53** 3.8** 3.89** 4.01** 
2010 3.08** 3.36** 3.42** 3.58** 
2011 3.38** 3.71** 3.76** 3.96** 
2012 2.91** 3.34** 3.54** 3.65** 
2013 3.3** 3.75 3.96** 4.07** 
2014 3.46** 3.95** 4.21** 4.32** 
2015 3.54** 4.08** 4.35** 4.46** 
2016 2.23** 2.71** 3.13** 3.29** 
2017 1.45** 2.07** 2.8** 2.77** 
Intercept 1.62** 0.7** 0.19** 0.12† 
N 890 916 921 921 
Log-Likelihood -1877.91 -1952.43 -11961.79 -1971.56 
AIC (df) 3801.82 (23) 3950.98 (23) 3969.58 (23) 3989.2 (23) 
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Table 5.8. Mixed-effects negative binomial 
regression     
Overdispersion: mean      
Group variable: Industry      
      
Groups = 18 method: mvaghermite    
Obs per group Integration points = 7    
min = 2      
avg = 65.1      
max = 634      
      
DV: IORs (lag) Coef.  DV: VC Funding (lag)   
      
Financial Dependence Remedies 0.148 ** IORs 0.032 ** 
Board Size 0.388 ** Board Size 0.082 * 
Board Opportunism -0.271 ** Board Opportunism -0.084 * 
Ent. Human Capital 0.098 ** Ent. Human Capital -0.132  
Firm Age 0.328 ** Firm Age 0.124 * 
VC Reputation 1.828  VC Reputation 2.97  
Firm Size 0.000 * Firm Size -0.0001  
Board Monitoring -0.382  Board Monitoring -0.209 * 
TMT Size 0.029  TMT Size 0.003  
year   year   
2008 0.000  2008 0  
2009 -19.245 ** 2009 1.12 * 
2010 -0.772  2010 0.96 * 
2011 -1.221 ** 2011 0.873 * 
2012 -1.346 ** 2012 0.655 * 
2013 -0.910 ** 2013 0.493 * 
2014 -1.001 ** 2014 0.386 * 
2015 -0.767 ** 2015 0.385 * 
2016 -0.642  2016 0.135 * 
2017 0.000  2017 0  
      
Intercept -3.88 ** Intercept -0.769 ** 
      
/lnalpha 0.65 ** /lnalpha -16.7  
      
N = 1,171   N = 1,186   
Wald χ2 2960000  Wald χ2 167  
Log pseudolikelihood  -466.67  Log pseudolikelihood  -1440.16  
Prob > χ2 0.00  Prob > χ2 0  
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Figure 5.2. Moderation Plot. 
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